Walden University

ScholarWorks
Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies

Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies
Collection

2019

Evaluating the Military Police Corps' Active
Shooter Preparedness Plan
Robert Lee Harris
Walden University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations
Part of the Public Policy Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please
contact ScholarWorks@waldenu.edu.

Walden University

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by

Robert Lee Harris Jr.

has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects,
and that any and all revisions required by
the review committee have been made.
Review Committee
Dr. Ian Cole, Committee Chairperson,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty
Dr. Gregory Koehle, Committee Member,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty
Dr. Lydia Forsythe, University Reviewer,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty

The Office of the Provost

Walden University
2019

Abstract
Evaluating the Military Police Corps’ Active Shooter Preparedness Plan
by
Robert Lee Harris Jr.

MA, American Military University, 2011
BS, American Military University, 2009
AS, Ashworth College, 2007

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Public Policy and Administration

Walden University
August 2019

Abstract
The Military Police Corps’ active shooter preparedness plan is inadequate because
several updated tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been developed over the
past 20 years and implemented by civilian law enforcement agencies have not been
incorporated, leaving the Corps less prepared during active shooter events. The purpose
of this phenomenological study was to examine how Military Police Corps leaders
trained their law enforcement and support personnel to respond to an active shooter
event. The institutional analysis and development framework was used to analyze the
day-to-day operational decisions within the Military Police Corps. Data for the
qualitative case study were collected through semi structured interviews with 15 Military
Police Corps leaders and soldiers across 5 military police battalions in the United States
and Europe and military police training records. These data were subjected to axial and
open coding, followed by a thematic analysis procedure. Participants perceived that the
Corps’ active shooter preparedness training hours and methodology are insufficient to
maintain proficiency in active shooter preparedness, that dispatchers are not properly
trained on receiving active shooter calls, and that live exercise training for first
responders is inadequate. Recommendations for Military Police Corps leadership include
updating the training methodology for first responders and dispatchers, providing better
tactical equipment for first responders, and revising policies in order to improve the
Military Police Corps’ active shooter preparedness program. Implementation of these
recommendations may promote public safety.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
When the Columbine High School shooting occurred in 1999, many in the United
States were stunned that 12 students had been killed and 24 were injured in an upper
middle-class area; normally, this type of tragedy is not associated with affluent areas
(Jenkins, 2017). Although the Columbine shooting was not the first active shooter event
in the United States, it seized the attention of society because the tactics used by
responding law enforcement officials gave the shooters 30 additional minutes to carry out
their assault (Jaymi, Schildkraut, & Stafford, 2016). The violence shocked communities
throughout the nation because of the location of the attack, the perpetrators, and the
carnage resulting from the deadly onslaught (Jaymi, Schildkraut, & Stafford, 2016).
Because the Columbine incident presented a new tactic for active shooters, it
compelled civilian law enforcement agencies throughout the country to review and
change their standard operating procedures on responding to an active shooter (Police
Executive Research Forum [PERF], 2014). Prior to Columbine, law enforcement first
responders would normally respond to the scene, set up a perimeter, and wait for the
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team to arrive on the scene; past incidents
revealed that armed shooters who took hostages did not do so with an intent to kill as
many people as possible (PERF, 2014). After the shooting at Columbine, many civilian
police agencies changed their approach to active shooter preparedness. For example,
leaders updated their training methodology for first responders, which required first
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responders to engage the active shooter upon arriving at the scene, they provided better
tactical equipment to first responders, revised policies in order to improve their
organizations active shooter preparedness program, and they provided active shooter
preparedness training to their 911 dispatchers to assist them with soliciting vital
information from callers.
Although Columbine triggered a paradigm shift within the civilian law
enforcement community, it generated no policy changes within the Military Police Corps.
The Columbine event occurred in April 1999, and domestic active shooter preparedness
training did not become a part of the military police training curriculum until 2010 (U.S.
Army Military Police School, 2010), which was 1 year after the Fort Hood 2009 active
shooter event and 11 years after Columbine. The 2009 Fort Hood active shooting event
caused Congress and senior leaders in the U.S. Department of Defense to address active
shooter events, which in turn placed pressure on the U.S. Department of the Army to
address the issue (Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 2010).
The 2009 Fort Hood active shooting event encouraged Military Police Corps
leaders to take positive steps towards improving active shooter response in light of the
increased active shooter incidents throughout the United States (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2013). For example, Military Police Corps leaders have implemented several
programs aimed at mitigating the effects of an active shooter. First, they have required
all law enforcement personnel and security guards to receive active shooter response
training annually. Although the Military Police Corps’ Active Shooter Preparedness
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Training Support Package (TSP) does not mandate a certain amount of training hours
annually, unit training schedules illustrated that they trained about 14 hours per year
(Unit Training Schedules [2014 thru 2016]). Second, leaders positioned Site on Wheels
on major Army installations to patch together different communications systems and
serve as a backup or replacement repeater that allows military police to communicate
with local law enforcement officers (U.S. Department of the Army, 2010). Third, leaders
instituted the Automated Installation Entry program, which is used to screen individuals’
criminal background history when they enter military installations (U.S. Department of
the Army, 2013). However, there are many areas within the Military Police Corps’ active
shooter preparedness plan that need updating to meet civilian police industry standards,
according to Harvey (2019). For instance, the Military Corps published a template in
2010 for responding to an active shooter event that has been criticized for its lack of
customizability (U.S. Department of the Army, 2010). According to the U.S. Department
of the Army (2010), the active shooter preparedness template was designed to be general
so that it could be tailored to separate installations. However, the template lacks
guidance on how Army installations can use the template to create a customized active
shooter preparedness plan (U.S. Department of the Army, 2010). Researchers (Blair,
Nichols, Burns, & Curnutt, 2013; Borelli, 2013; Lankford, 2016) have illustrated the
importance of an individualized active shooter preparedness plan for each organization or
installation. Custom-made plans improve the response time and overall management of
an active shooter event because they allow the first responders to perform live exercises
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within their area of responsibility, which increases knowledge of the terrain the responder
may have to operate in during an event (Borelli, 2013). Custom plans also provide the
opportunity to establish collaboration agreements with adjacent jurisdictions (Kapucu,
Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010).
Although many civilian law enforcement agencies have developed procedures to
respond to and manage active shooter events, the majority of the 17,985 law enforcement
agencies in the United States have fewer than 10 officers and few resources at their
disposal (U.S. Department of Justice, 2015). To have an effective active shooter
preparedness plan, all law enforcement agencies need proper resources, human capital,
and the support of the community. I conducted this phenomenological study to identify
best practices and lessons learned when responding to an active shooter event. Findings
may be applicable to civilian and military law enforcement agencies. Implications for
military agencies include providing knowledge that leaders of the Military Police Corps
may be able to use to provide better training and equipment for their personnel, which
may eventually save lives.
This chapter includes the problem statement, the purpose of the study, the
research question, and the theoretical framework for this phenomenological study. I
present the nature of the study, define key terms, and discuss existing research regarding
the challenges law enforcement personnel face during an active shooter event.
Additionally, I identify the gap in the literature that engendered the study as well as
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discuss the assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, and significance of the
study. I summarize key points in the chapter’s conclusion.
Background
Improving the Military Police Corps’ law enforcement experiences has important
and long-lasting consequences for base security. Finding ways to improve the Military
Police Corps’ emergency management and law enforcement skill sets may help mitigate
the loss of life, injuries, and significantly reduce damage to government and personal
property (Blair, Nichols, Burns, & Curnutt, 2013; Borelli, 2013; Lankford, 2016).
Previous researchers (Capellan, 2015; Feemster, 2010; Sanow, 2013) have shown that the
Military Police Corps’ active shooter response plan is out-of-date and lacks key elements
that could be used to save the lives of civilians and first responders. The types of
emergencies law enforcement personnel confront on a daily basis are growing in
complexity, and law enforcement training curriculum must change to adapt to the type of
real-world issues responders encounter while performing their duties (Feemster, 2010).
Active shooter training by civilian law enforcement agencies is on the rise
because of the increased numbers of active shooter events that have occurred during the
past several years (Sanow, 2013). Many states have experienced active shooter events
that resulted in deaths and injuries (Gun Violence Archive, 2017). Civilian law
enforcement agencies are using different tactical formations to improve their active
shooter preparedness plans (Sanow, 2013). For example, numerous law enforcement
agencies have added emergency medical technicians to their patrol formations to help
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provide medical treatment to victims more quickly (Sanow, 2013). Implementation of
new tactical formations into the Military Police Corps’ active shooter preparedness plan
may also improve the Corps’ overall active shooter response.
Active shootings still present a serious problem for the law enforcement
community because criminals and terrorists have shown their willingness to use firearms
to kill, maim, and terrorize innocent people (Feemster, 2010). Furthermore, criminals
and terrorist are adaptive, which means law enforcement agencies must continue to
improve their training curricula (Price, 2012). To have an effective active shooter
preparedness plan, the Military Police Corps should be well versed in the tactics
employed by domestic terrorist cells and criminals so that those tactics can be
incorporated into live exercises (Price, 2012). Active shooter events can occur in any
location (country, town, neighborhood, etc.), and they have the potential of producing a
large number of casualties (Price, 2012). There were more than 200 active shooter events
in the United States between 2000 and 2015, producing over 1,200 casualties (Ruff,
2016).
The lack of research on the effectiveness and relevancy of the U.S. Army’s active
shooter preparedness training compelled this examination of the Military Police Corps’
overall management of active shooter events. Determining the effectiveness of the
Army’s active shooter preparedness training is the existing gap in the literature. In
conducting this phenomenological study, I sought to provide insight about the efficacy of
current Army training. Filling the gap in the literature is the first step to ensure that the
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Military Police Corps’ active shooter preparedness training is effective, relevant, and in
line with other federal and state law enforcement agencies. After the 2009 Fort Hood
shooting, Congress provided the U.S. Department of Defense with various
recommendations designed to improve the overall protection on military installations
against active shooters (U. S. Department of the Army, 2010). In 2010, Gates accepted
26 of those recommendations (Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 2010); however,
many of those recommendations have not been implemented, even though it has been
years since the shooting. Findings from this study may provide Army decision makers
with additional knowledge they can use to improve the Corps’ active shooter
preparedness training.
Problem Statement
Prior research on active shooter incidents can be grouped into three extensive
classifications. The first is research that focuses on tactics used by active shooters (e.g.,
Jaymi, Schildkraut, & Stafford, 2016). The second encompasses the type of active
shooter preparedness training and tactics civilian law enforcement use to combat active
shooters (e.g., Jaymi, Schildkraut, & Stafford, 2016). The final classification covers
emergency management collaboration agreements between local government
administrators and business owners (e.g., Jaymi, Schildkraut, & Stafford, 2016).
Multiple active shooter incidents have occurred on military bases, and the military
police response has not always been adequate (U.S. Department of the Army, 2010). The
Military Police Corps’ active shooter preparedness training, equipment, and policy have
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not been properly updated and may exacerbate an already difficult problem presented by
active shooters. During the past 7 years, active shooter incidents have increased by 16%
in the United States (U.S. Department of Justice, 2014). However, between 2008 and
2016, 17 active shooting incidents occurred on military installations, which represents a
250% increase from 2001 through 2007 (U.S. Department of Justice, 2014). A review of
the literature (e.g., Borelli, 2013; Feemster, 2010; U.S. Department of Justice, 2014)
validates that active shooting incidents are a clear and present danger to the public and all
law enforcement personnel. Several civilian law enforcement organizations have
established effective standard operating procedures to mitigate the effects of an active
shooter (PERF, 2014).
A review of the literature revealed no found studies were conducted to examine
the effectiveness of the Military Police Corps’ active shooter management plan (in
comparison to civilian law enforcement agencies) at the headquarters level, the major
command level, or at individual installations. Although there is sufficient evidence that
demonstrates how civilian law enforcement agencies have improved their overall
management of active shooter events (Capellan, 2015; Feemster, 2010; Sanow, 2013), I
found no studies in which the Military Police Corps’ active shooter preparedness plan
had been compared to those of civilian law enforcement agencies to determine
effectiveness and relevancy. For example, after the Virginia Tech shooting, civilian law
enforcement agencies updated their active shooter preparedness plans with (a) education
on breaching techniques for regular patrol officers--training that had normally been

9
reserved for SWAT members--and (b) issuing of breaching tools to patrol officers for
forced entry (DiMaria, 2012). Active shooters have existed for decades, and there is a
large body of knowledge that could be used to improve the Military Police Corps’ active
shooter preparedness plan (e.g., Lankford, 2016). Historically, active shooters have
mimicked successful active shooters’ tactics, which makes it imperative for law
enforcement agencies across the United States to incorporate the industry’s best practices
into their active shooter preparedness plan on a consistent basis. This study may provide
insight that Military Police Corps leaders can use to update their plans to reflect these
best practices.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study was to determine the effectiveness of the Army’s active
shooter preparedness training by examining the policies and procedures and comparing
them to civilian law enforcement policies and procedures for active shooter preparedness.
I reviewed how the Military Police Corps responded to an active shooter event by
conducting interviews with junior, midgrade, and senior military police officers to
determine their perceptions about the active shooter training they receive from their units
and to determine if organizational procedures have hindered the evolution of the Military
Police Corps’ law enforcement paradigm.
Since the beginning of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the Military Police Corps’
law enforcement skillset has suffered from frequent deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq
(U.S. Department of the Army, 2015). Furthermore, during the past several years, the
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Military Police Corps’ training schedules have illustrated a sizable discrepancy between
law enforcement training and security and mobility support skills training (U.S.
Department of the Army, 2016). In particular, training records illustrated that units
conducted security and mobility support skills training more frequently than law
enforcement training (Unit Training Schedules, 2014 thru 2016); this prioritization means
that more resources and training are allotted towards combat skills. The findings from
my research, which includes reviewing the Department of Defense’s new Law
Enforcement (LE) Standards and Training Issuance (DODI 55.25.15, 2019) confirmed
that more training and resources are needed to improve the Military Police Corps’ law
enforcement capabilities. The Military Police Corps has the following battlefield
functions: maneuver and mobility support operations (reconnaissance and surveillance),
area security operations (site security and response), law and order operations (law
enforcement and developing host-nation police forces), internment/resettlement
operations (military prisoners and enemy combatants), and police intelligence operations
(FM 3-19.1, 2004). The data also show senior military police commanders how
supporting the new policing methodology may help to bridge the security gap in the
Military Police Corps active shooter preparedness plan.
Research Question
The research question (RQ) was, How can civilian law enforcement policing
strategies help improve the Military Police Corps’ response to an active shooter?
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Theoretical Framework
The link between inadequate performance during active shooter events, lack of
active shooter preparedness training, outdated training curriculum, obsolete or inadequate
equipment, and a lack of governing policies is well established in the literature (Blair et
al., 2013; Borelli, 2013; Brennan, 2012; Feemster, 2010). Operational and environmental
impediments can be described by using the institutional analysis and development (IAD)
framework. The IAD framework is designed to examine shared action with a focus on
institutions (Anderies & Janson, 2013). Broadly defined, institutions are the prescriptions
that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions, such as
households, schools, hospitals, companies, and courts of law (Anderies & Janson, 2013).
These measures, also known as rules or norms, can be used broadly from creating
household rules to international treaties (Ostrom, 2010). Because rules and norms are
essentially human constructs, agreed upon or recognized by a group of people, they are
not immutable (Anderies & Janson, 2013). Individuals can decide whether to follow the
rules or norms. In addition, their choices and actions have consequences for themselves
and for others (Anderies & Janson, 2013).
The IAD framework is ideal for this phenomenological study because it addresses
core issues related to defending against active shooters. The IAD framework
materialized from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana
University, established by Ostrom and Ostrom (Anderies & Janson, 2013). The IAD
framework includes multiple levels of institutional analysis (Ostrom, 2010); however, for
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this phenomenological study, the emphasis was on the operational level because its main
goal is to focus where individuals collectively make decisions about day-to-day activities.
Rules and norms are significant in any organization because they are the parameters by
which organizations make daily operational decisions (Ostrom, 2010). For instance, rules
and norms within the Military Police Corps dictates how law enforcement personnel view
their law enforcement mission. Regardless of the settings, rules and norms apply;
however, the specifics of these rules will differ depending on the location. For example,
the rules and norms at work are different than those at an individual’s home (Anderies &
Janson, 2013). Findings from this phenomenological study may show that senior law
enforcement commanders have the ability to affect change within the organizational
structure by adopting some of the rules and norms of civilian law enforcement agencies,
which may advance the Military Police Corps’ law enforcement development.
Nature of the Study
I used the qualitative research method to interview 15 military law enforcement
personnel, consisting of senior Military Police Corps leaders (Pay Grade 05 through 06),
midlevel leaders (Pay Grade E-7 through 04), and junior soldiers and leaders (Pay Grade
E-1 through E-6). The five battalions were selected because of their geographical
locations and their size. The design consisted of a 30 to 45-minute, unstructured audiorecorded interview with each participant to glean individual perspectives and experiences
on active shooter preparedness. I interviewed each participant by telephone. The
methodology included a descriptive data analysis technique to describe the main
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characteristic of the data and an exploratory analysis to look for unknown relationship
and provide future recommendation.
Qualitative research is consistent with the need for a complex and detailed
understanding of how the Military Police Corps uses its resources to prevent or mitigate
active shooter incidents, which is the focus of this investigation. The Military Police
Corps’ active shooter preparedness training may be predicated on financial restraints,
personal biases, or simply a lack of knowledge. I used the IAD framework to highlight
the rules and norms of the Military Police Corps, which will help illuminate the decisionmaking process of Military Police Corps leaders. By interviewing 15 military law
enforcement personnel, and reviewing public law enforcement archival data, I gained
insight and solutions for the growing problem of active shooters and demonstrate the
effectiveness of the Army’s active shooter preparedness training.
Active shooter events represent a real phenomenon that shakes the practicalities
of one’s appreciation of well-being, trepidation, and inquietude (U.S. Department of
Justice, 2016). From 2000 to 2016, approximately 80 casualties and 28 deaths occurred
per year, but in comparison to traffic casualties, the odds of any single individual being a
victim of an active shooter are low (U.S. Department of Justice, 2016; National Safety
Council, 2017). In 2016, the U.S. experienced more than 40,000 traffic fatalities for the
first time in 10 years (National Safety Council, 2017). Although traffic accidents cause
many more casualties on a yearly basis than active shooters, active shooter events have a
more significant psychological effect on a community. The associated dread that
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inculcates from an active shooter event mandates that government agencies, law
enforcement organizations, business communities, and individuals act prudently to
mitigate the effects of an active shooter event through preparedness training (Zeemering
& Delabbio, 2013). Although it is impossible for elected official and law enforcement
personnel to prevent all active shooter events, having a robust active shooter
preparedness plan will help mitigate casualties and property damages.
Definitions
Active shooter. An individual actively involved in killing or trying to kill people
in a conﬁned and occupied area. In most cases, firearms are used, and there is no pattern
or method to the shooter’s selection of victims (U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
2016).
Army Force generation process. The method for effectively and efficiently
generating trained and ready forces for combatant commanders on a sustainable,
rotational basis (U.S. Department of the Army, 2009).
Concealment. The protection from observation of oneself from aggressors (U.S.
Department of the Army, 1984).
Contextualization. The process of examining or interpreting something that is
separate from the context in which it is embedded (Merriam-Webster’s collegiate
dictionary, 2003).
Cover. Protection from the fire of hostile weapons (U.S. Department of the Army,
1984).
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Deidentification. The process to prevent a person’s identity from being connected
with information (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2015). Common uses
of deidentification include human subject research for the sake of privacy of research
participants (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2015).
Military Police Corps leaders. Law enforcement supervisors between the rank of
corporal and colonel (military and civilians) who are responsible for the day-to-day
supervision of other law enforcement and support personnel.
Pay Grade E-1 through E-6. Junior soldiers and leaders (to include civilian law
enforcement personnel).
Pay Grade E-7 through O4. Midlevel leaders (to include civilian law enforcement
personnel).
Pay Grade O5 and O6. Senior leaders (to include civilian law enforcement
personnel).
Outlier. Something that lies outside the main body or group.
Soft target. A person or thing that is relatively unprotected or vulnerable,
especially to military or terrorist attack.
Standard operating procedures. Established or prescribed methods to be followed
routinely for the performance of designated operations or in designated situations.
Terrorism. The unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against
civilians, in the pursuit of political aims.
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Validity. A concept that refers to how well a scientific test or piece of research
actually measures what it sets out to, or how well it reflects the reality it claims to
represent (Creswell, 2007).
Assumptions
Five assumptions are associated with this phenomenological study. Junior leaders
and law enforcement personnel will be part of the participant pool because it is assumed
that they will provide unguarded responses and will not be concerned with protecting
their unit’s reputation. The promise of anonymity and confidentiality will likely
encourage junior leaders to be truthful even if the information about their organization is
negative. In addition, it is assumed that the U.S. Department of the Army Civilian Police
(DACP) participants will be more forthcoming than Military Police Corps soldiers
because they are more concerned with the law enforcement mission than the combat
mission. Generally speaking, DACPs have more law enforcement training than military
police soldiers, which makes them more invested in the law enforcement mission. It is
assumed that a qualitative phenomenological study of the participants’ operational
environment is the best course of actions. Determining the strengths and weaknesses of
the Military Police Corps’ active shooter preparedness plan is best determined with a
qualitative research approach. The use of triangulation provided research from several
sources to determine if senior military and civilian leaders truly grasp the many problems
an active shooter presents for first responders and community members. Finally, it is
assumed that senior military leaders may provide guarded responses because they are
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concerned with protecting their unit’s reputation. Senior leaders are responsible for the
units’ successes and failures and it is only natural to assume that it is highly likely they
will give guarded responses in order to protect their reputations.
Scope and Delimitations
The delimitations for this phenomenological study are based on my
comprehension of the dynamics that influence the Military Police Corps’ senior
leadership decision-making process in connection to law enforcement operations. In
addition, my goal was to determine the effectiveness of the Army’s active shooter
preparedness training and identify new tactics, techniques, and procedures to enhance the
Military Police Corps’ active shooter preparedness policies. To accomplish this (with the
study sample limited to 15 individuals at five Army installations), I reviewed elements
that support the Military Police Corps adopting new tactics to combat active shooter
events. The installations designated for this phenomenological study were selected
because of their size, diverse population, and geographical locations. The carefully
chosen installations have some of the largest law enforcement contingency and the largest
population. Snowball sampling was used to identify 15 participants, who were
interviewed via telephone to collect the data. Telephonic interviews helped mitigate the
expense associated with conducting in-person interviews at multiple locations. Snowball
sampling was chosen because it simplified the process of obtaining formal permission
from the U.S. Department of the Army to interview the target population. After
identifying the participants, each participant received a consent form and a copy of the
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interview questions via email. Electronic mail was used to deliver the consent form to the
participants for expediency.
Limitations
Four limitations are related with this phenomenological study and each limitation
relates to methodological weaknesses. The first is working with a small participant pool,
including senior Military Police Corps leaders [Pay Grade 05 through 06], mid-level
leaders [Pay Grade E-7 through 04], junior leaders [E-5 through E-6] and junior soldiers
and leaders [Pay Grade E-1 through E-4]), which may hinder data saturation. Data
saturation is an important element of qualitative research and failing to reach it will
influence the research and restrict content validity, which is required to demonstrate that
the research is valid and that it answers the research question. The nature of the small
participant pool limitation is artificially created to provide an expedient and judicious
execution of the research; however, taking participants from large, medium, and small
installations provided reasonable measures to address this limitation. Second, sampling
specifically drawn from the U.S. Army law enforcement population may result in
groupthink responses. Armed forces and law enforcement individuals are extremely
cohesive (due to their training and experiences) and are trained to solve problems as a
team, which could make it harder for individual voice an independent idea.
Although it is reasonable that the sampling came from the military, pulling from
one specific group may result in groupthink, thus making improvement difficult. The
inclusion of law enforcement personnel with different ranks and positions enhanced the
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probability that groupthink did not occur. Third, participants may provide erroneous
information because they may view me as an outsider trying to embarrass the Military
Police Corps. Finally, disgruntled participants may provide inaccurate information
because they are dissatisfied with their employer. During any type of research or
investigation that requires interaction with the population, there will always be a
possibility of receiving erroneous or exaggerated information from participants because
of ulterior motives. To address this type of limitation, I reviewed and compare the
responses received and look for outliers, which may require further investigation for
clarity. In addition to receiving erroneous or exaggerated information from participants,
investigators must also be aware of their own biases. For example, I work as a Law
Enforcement and Emergency Management Specialist (Department of Defense
Contractor) assigned to the Pentagon (HQ Department of the Army G34 Protection
Directorate); and because of my position I have access to classified information, law
enforcement sensitive information, internal memorandums and emails that are not
available to the public or to law enforcement personnel in subordinate organizations. For
bias mitigation purposes, I chose only to use documents that have been released to the
public or those that can be obtained via the Freedom of Information Act.
Significance
According to the U.S. Department of Justice (2016), between the years 2000 and
2016, almost 200 active shooter events have occurred throughout the U.S., which have
caused more than 1,000 causalities (deaths and injuries). This phenomenological study is
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significant because there have been 17 active shooter situations on military installations
since the 2009 Fort Hood shootings (U.S. Department of Justice, 2016). This
phenomenological study may assist the Military Police Corps’ leadership with their
decision-making process, updating their training methodology for first responders and
911 dispatchers, provide better tactical equipment for first responders, and enlighten the
Military Police Corps’ leadership on the importance of having an effective emergency
management collaboration agreement with local law enforcement agencies. In addition,
the phenomenological study is significant for civilian law enforcement organizations
because it identified best practices and lesson learned when responding to an active
shooter event. Although it is true that many civilian law enforcement agencies have
developed procedures to respond to and manage active shooter events, numerous
agencies (with 10 or less officers) could benefit from the phenomenological study
because many organizations do not have adequate polices or procedures on responding to
an active shooter event.
Summary
Despite being one of the most powerful armies in the world, active shooter events
within the military community have illustrated security gaps on military installations.
During the past 7 years, active shooter incidents have increased by 16% in the United
States (U.S. Department of Justice, 2016). However, between 2008 and 2016 there have
been 17 active shooting incidents occurring on military installations, which represent a
250% increase since the previous 9 years (1999 to 2007; U.S. Department of Justice,
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2016). This phenomenological study will fill the gap in the literature by demonstrating
the effectiveness of the Army’s active shooter preparedness training.
According to research data, active shooter events are trending upwards and with
every successful attack the “enemy/ criminal elements” take notice (U.S. Department of
Justice, 2016). The type of service calls law enforcement personnel are required to
respond to are growing in complexity and to provide adequate protection to the
community the training curriculum must be reflective of the real world issues they may
encounter while performing their duty as first responders.
In Chapter 2, I examined current studies on updated active shooter preparedness
plans and the leadership decision-making process to determine the best course of action
for improving the Military Police Corps’ active shooter preparedness plan.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
According to the U.S. Department of Justice (2014), from 2000 to 2013, an
average of 11 active shooting events occurred annually in the United States. The
distribution of events is highly concentrated in the last 7 years of this time frame;
however, with 16 events occurring between 2007 to 2013 (versus six between 2000 and
2006), representing an increase of more than 150% (p. 13). However, between 2008 and
2016, 17 active shooting incidents occurred on military installations, which represents a
250% increase from the previous 9 years (1999 to 2007; U.S. Department of Justice,
2016, p. 29). (See Figure 1 for a comparison of active shooter events on military vs.
nonmilitary installations between 2008-2016.) In a published update to the U.S.
Department of Justice’s 2014 report, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI; 2016)
found the amount of active shooter events increased slightly between 2014 to 2016 to 51
events, while the previous 3 years (2011 to 2013) had only 48 events. Of note, the cutoff
date for 2016 was June, thus leaving 6 months unaccounted for.

23

Active Shooter Events 2008
thru 2016
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Military Installation Active
Shooter Events

Non-Military Installation Active
Shooter Events

Figure 1. Active shooter events. Adapted from “2008 to 2016 Active Shooter Events,” by
U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016
(https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/activeshooter_incidents_2001-2016.pdf/view). In the
public domain.
Some research indicates that the lack of an active shooter preparedness plan may
increase rates for injuries and fatalities in communities. Wands (2016), for instance,
discovered that there are still law enforcement agencies and communities (17 years later
after the Columbine shooting) in the United States without a robust active shooter
preparedness plan, which may result in more injuries and deaths. As Wands noted, there
were 231 casualties attributed to active shooter events between 2014 and 2015; “six of
these incidents ended with quick citizen action” (p. 388). A review of the literature (e.g.,
Borelli, 2013; Feemster, 2010; U.S. Department of Justice, 2014) validates that active
shooting incidents are a clear and present danger to the public and to law enforcement
personnel.
The Military Police Corps has three main missions: police operations, detention
operations, and security and mobility support. The Corps’ primary mission is police
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operations (U.S. Department of the Army, 2014). The skills and capabilities needed to
perform detention operations and security and mobility support are derived from
conducting police operations (U.S. Department of the Army, 2014). According to the
U.S. Department of the Army (2014), frequent deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan over
a 15-year time frame have deteriorated the Military Police Corps’ law enforcement skills
and other capabilities (p. 151). The frequent deployments have resulted in more
resources and training being allotted for security and mobility support skills, leaving a
gap in readiness for active shooter events. In this phenomenological study, I used data
from military units residing in the United States and Europe to show the difference in
training time between security and mobility support skills and active shooter
preparedness. Military commanders are tasked with ensuring their soldiers are well
trained for their assigned mission. They have the authority to tailor the unit training
schedule to address training gaps that may affect unit readiness (U.S. Department of the
Army, 2015).
The objective of this literature review is to examine, analyze, and fuse the
literature on active shooter response. The chapter offers an inclusive review of the
theoretical and conceptual bases of active shooter response. I examine the tools used by
law enforcement organizations to combat active shooters and determine their
effectiveness. The chapter includes sections on my literature search strategy and
theoretical framework, followed by a review of the literature. The literature review
includes a definition of an active shooter and discussion of the following topics: active
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shooters trends, analysis of tactics used to combat active shooters, tools available to law
enforcement to combat active shooters, and policy choices for active shooter events. The
chapter ends with a summary and conclusion section.
Literature Search Strategy
I used the Walden University Library to search for literature relevant to mitigating
active shooter events. The selected literature aided me in developing the theoretical
framework for this phenomenological study. The following is a list of key terms used to
review germane literature: active shooter, active shooter response, active shooter
management, law enforcement training, active shooters on military installations, Military
Police Corps law enforcement training, active shooter and terrorism, military culture,
and emergency dispatcher training.
The literature review highlighted that a well-conceived active shooter response
plan requires standardizing policies and providing updated instruction to the populace
regarding the best course of action when involved in an active shooter event. Such a plan
should be supported by empirical findings from previous active shooter events. In
addition, I reviewed several studies and articles pertaining to active shooter preparedness,
multijurisdiction collaboration, training, and recovery; however, the majority of the
literature were related to civilian law enforcement agencies improving their active
shooter preparedness. I found few studies concerning active shooter preparedness within
the military law enforcement community. Because little research on active shooter
preparedness exists within the military law enforcement community, the literature review
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demonstrated the necessity for military law enforcement community to adopt the best
practices of civilian law enforcement agencies for active shooter preparedness.
Although numerous agencies, including those in the federal government, have
adopted the Run, Hide, and Fight (RHF) paradigm as a best practice (Careless, 2015),
Blair et al. (2013) delineated that the Fight option of RHF should be the first course of
action instead of the Run option. Blair et al. highlighted how a majority of the casualties
occurred while victims were running away from the shooters and while attempting to
hide in unfortified rooms. The researchers revealed that nearly 40% of the shooters were
subdued (without weapons) or shot by citizens before law enforcement arrived on the
scene (Blair et al., 2013). The data presented by Blair et al. justify the review of the U.S.
government’s endorsement of RHF.
Walden University Library and Google was the principal means of accessing
academic databases and websites. The primary databases used to search for the key
terms were Google Scholar, ProQuest, Sage Journals Online, EBSCOhost, Parameters
(U.S. Army War College Press, Carlisle Barracks, and Pennsylvania), Center for Army
Lessons Learned (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas) and the Army Publishing Directorate.
Theoretical Framework
I selected the IAD framework for this phenomenological study because it
addressed core issues (appropriate day-to-day decision making, training, and equipment)
related to defending against active shooters. The IAD framework materialized from the
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, established by
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Elinor and Ostrom in 2009. The IAD is applicable to this phenomenological study
because senior law enforcement commanders have the ability to affect change within the
organizational structure and could therefore hinder or advance the Military Police Corps’
law enforcement evolution. The IAD identifies multiple levels of institutional analysis;
however, the emphasis of this phenomenological study was on the operational level
because its main goal is to focus where individuals collectively make decisions about
day-to-day activities.
In the past, researchers have mainly used the IAD to study the controlling of
communal resources, such as public infrastructure and common-pool resources (Ostrom,
2010). The IAD framework summarizes the communal efforts to understand the ways in
which organizations operate and change over time. The framework ascribes all pertinent
descriptive issues and variables to groups in an effort to determine rational relationships
(Ostrom, 2010, p. 2). Through this phenomenological study, I illustrated its effectiveness
to evaluate the efficiency of decision-making and policy reform. In 21st-century society,
citizens interaction with institutions (federal, state, local, and private) that govern daily
activities are inescapable. With so much oversight, using IAD to evaluate institutions is
not only logical, but is also a necessity to ensure that institutions are providing proper
regulatory supervision and agency leaders are adaptable to an ever-changing world.
Living in an intricate, interrelated, and a frequently changing society underpins
the inherent need for adaptability for government officials and the citizens they serve
(Löf, 2014). Löf (2014) discussed how important it is for leaders of organizations and
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communities to have the ability to make appropriate day-to-day decisions for the good of
their organizations or communities, especially during turbulent times.
Literature Review Related to Key Variables and/or Concepts
Active Shooter Trends
Although active shooters are geospatially dispersed, motivated by various
reasons, and have no affiliation with each other, their tactics and characteristics are
appallingly similar. The U.S. Department of Justice 2014 report was a study of active
shooter incidents in the U.S. between 2000 and 2013. In addition, the FBI 2016 updated
report includes active shooter incidents in the U.S. in 2014 and 2015. I used these reports
as base documents for establishing a trend analysis of active shooter events. In more than
15% of the events, the active shooter was mobile during the event (U.S. Department of
Justice, 2014, p. 6), which exasperated the situation. From a tactical perspective,
engaging a mobile assailant is difficult and requires intense and regular training session
(FM 7-8, 2013). Responding to an active shooter is already a difficult task for law
enforcement because of its asymmetrical nature, but when the shooters are moving from
one site to another, it makes the situation more difficult for law enforcement personnel.
Updating tactics to combat active shooters presents a difficult problem for law
enforcement, administrators, and society because such events are highly difficult to
predict (U.S. Department of the Army, 2015). However, one of the best courses of action
is to review past incidents and conduct a trend analysis to help improve future
management and response strategies. However, caution must be used because criminals
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tend to conduct their own analysis of law enforcement tactics and procedures in order to
counter them (U.S. Department of the Army, 2015).
With almost 70% of the active shooter events occurring at businesses (U.S.
Department of Justice, 2014, p. 12), it is likely that businesses are the primary objective
for active shooters because they are considered soft targets. The U.S. Department of
Justice (2014) report, along with other researchers (Brennan, 2012; Capellan, 2015;
Ergenbright & Hubbard, 2012), illustrated that active shooters overwhelmingly target
businesses more than any other location. It is probable that active shooters will continue
to target businesses disproportionately. Throughout the United States, active shooter
events have steadily increased since 2008; seventeen of those events occurred on military
installations (in business-like environments, i.e. medical facilities, shopping centers, and
office buildings) or military-leased properties (U.S. Department of Justice, 2014, p. 15).
The Fort Hood report (2010) reviewed the Military Police Corps’ response and
management of the 2010 active shooter event. The researchers of the report noted how
the quick response of the first responders prevented the Fort Hood shooter from killing
and hurting many more individuals. However, the researchers also highlighted several
areas in which the Military Police Corps can improve upon (more training, better
technology, better equipment, etc.).
Terrorism
Lankford (2016), Lies (2016), Capellan (2015), and Feemster (2010) delineated
that terrorist organizations’ use of active shooters is a tactic shared by terrorist
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organizations and criminals throughout the world. Although terrorist attacks occur more
frequently in many countries than in the United States (Economics and Peace, 2015), that
does not mean the United States will not experience an increase in terrorist attacks. The
effects of terrorism are experienced around the world, but countries in the Middle East,
Asia, and Africa experience the majority of deaths (78%) produced by terrorist attacks
(Economics and Peace, 2015, p. 3). Acts of terrorism during the past several years have
exemplified that the U.S. military community, in particular, has experienced an increased
amount of active shooter events (Capellan, 2015; Feemster, 2010; Lankford, 2016; Lies,
2016). Although the FBI 2016 updated report on active shooter events confirmed that
active shooter incidents have been on the rise, it is not a new phenomenon. Figure 2
shows the number of active shooter events that occurred in the United States from 2013
thru 2016.
U.S. Department of the Army (2010) and the FBI (2016) demonstrated how
difficult it is for law enforcement or other officials to predict when an active shooter
event will occur, identify an active shooter prior to the event, or defend against active
shooters.
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Figure 2. U.S. active shooter chart. Adapted from “2000 to 2016 Active Shooter
Incidents,” by U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016
(https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/activeshooter_incidents_2001-2016.pdf/view). In the
public domain.
The United States is not the only country that is having a difficult time with
preventing and responding to active shooter events. In 2008 10 attackers entered the city
of Mumbia, India, from multiple locations and caused mass hysteria when they began
shooting people indiscriminately (Capellan, 2015). The Mumbia attack was significant
because it highlighted how a small group of determined killers were able to kill scores of
individuals, cause millions of dollars’ worth of damages, and evade one of the largest
police forces in the world for almost three days. Despite having a superior force, better
equipment, and weapons, the attack exposed multiple security gaps within Mumbai’s
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government (Capellan, 2015). The official after-action review of the attack explained
how Mumbai’s laws prevented a whole of government response approach, which
significantly hindered their reaction time and overall management of the incident
(Capellan, 2015). Prior to the attack, Mumbai had laws that prevented the Army from
responding to terrorist attacks that occurred within the police department’s jurisdiction
(Capellan, 2015).
The review also revealed that Mumbai’s police force was not properly trained for
active shooter events. Capellan (2015) also explored how the terrorists used social media
and live news updates to keep track of the law enforcements efforts and progress, which
made it easier for the 10-man team to evade capture (Capellan, 2015), which suggest a
holistic active shooter preparedness plan must address media presence and operations
security. The Military Police Corps’ current active shooter preparedness plan does not
discuss operations security and how the media may compromise tactics by inadvertently
passing on crucial operational information to active shooters during an event. Operations
security (OPSEC) is a method that identifies unclassified but crucial information to
determine if friendly actions can be detected and used by adversaries/ criminal elements
to help accomplish their goals. For any operations to be successful, OPSEC must be a
fundamental part of the plan.
Active shooter events can occur in any location and they have the potential of
harming a high number of victims. Between 2000 and 2015, the U.S. experienced 200
active shooter events and more than 1,200 casualties (Ruff, 2016). Although no location
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is immune, ample data illustrates how commercial facilities (office buildings, factories,
warehouses, retail stores, restaurants, etc.) are preferred venues for active shooters (Ruff,
2016).
Although businesses are the leading location where active shoot events occur
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2014), U.S. schools and universities are the second most
common locations where active shooter events occur. Since the Columbine High School
massacre, there have been 50 school shootings (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI],
2016). After the Columbine High School active shooter event of 1999, law enforcement
agencies across the country started changing their polices and tactics for responding to an
active shooter event. Multiple researchers (Barnes, 2012; McCarthy, 2014; Wands, 2016)
have illustrated how law enforcement leaders across the nation have changed the way
their organizations respond to an active shooter event.
One of the major changes was a discontinued practice of patrol officers containing
the scene and waiting on the SWAT team or additional back up (first officer on scene will
proceed to engage the shooter). In addition, many organizations made the following
changes, (a) patrol officers will have long-riffles in their vehicles, (b) officers will not
stop to render aid to victims (will proceed towards threat), (c) dispatchers are trained on
active shooter threat information protocol, and (d) officers are issued ballistic shields
(Barnes, 2012; McCarthy, 2014; Wands, 2016). Even though more than 16 years have
passed since the Columbine active shooter event, tactics and polices are still developing
because stopping active shooters is a daunting task. The U.S. Department of Justice
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2014, “Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the U.S. between 2000 and 2013,” indicated
that active shooters not only looked to past events for inspiration, but they also copied
operational details.
Although active shooter events appear to happen without warning, many experts
(Blair et al., 2013; Capellan, 2015; Supervisory Special Agent Andre Simons, -; U.S.
Department of Justice, 2014) believe that is not the case. Investigations of past events
and the perpetrators revealed that the shooters developed well thought-out plans,
spending several months or years of planning before the shooting. In most cases, the
shooters said or did things that were abnormal or disturbing to their family and friends,
who knew them well (PERF, 2014).
Although active shooter events occur more frequently in civilian communities than
in military communities (U.S. Department of Justice, 2014), the U.S. Department of the
Army still recognized the need to direct the Military Police Corps to develop a training
packet to assist the security forces (law enforcement and security guards) with responding
to and containing an active shooter. The tragedy illustrated that law enforcement response
speed and courage are essential when responding to an active shooter event (Blair et al.,
2013). Frazzano and Snyder (2014) illustrated how a speedy response to an active shooter
is a vital part of any active shooter preparedness plan because the sooner the shooter is
neutralized, the more lives will be saved. Developing an all-inclusive emergency action
plan along with a realistic active shooter preparedness training curriculum will equip law
enforcement personnel with the required skills and confidence to properly manage and
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respond to an active shooter event (U.S. Army Military Police School, 2010). In 2010,
less than a year after the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, the U.S. Army Military Police School
released the Active Shooter Response Training Support Package (TSP; U.S. Army
Military Police School, 2010). The packet outlines several courses of action regarding
how to respond to and manage an active shooter event. Although the TSP was a
significant effort to address a highly complex problem, the packet has several gaps that
need filling. For example, the TSP contradicts or makes unrealistic claims or expectations
pertaining to some of the most recent and updated active shooter response training
developed by federal and local law enforcement (U.S. Army Military Police School,
2010). The authors of the TSP stated the following regarding what to do when
approaching the scene of an active shooter:
Make no mistake about it, the patrolmen/CSGs making contact with the suspect
during this stage is in danger, but as long as they keep an open mind on every
single individual present, they can stay safe. There is a fine line between having
your name on an award and your name on a wall. The difference is often being
prepared, being aware and being highly skilled. (U.S. Army Military Police
School, 2010, p. 27)
By alluding that officers’ safety is dependent on keeping an “open mind on every single
individual” (U.S. Army Military Police School, 2010, p. 27), the findings contradict
current data that suggest better equipment, training, policies, and information sharing
from the public will improve law enforcement personnel survival rates.
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The second issue with the TSP is that it identifies obstacles or problems officers
may encounter when responding to an active shooter event but offers few solutions. For
example, when actively engaging the shooter, the TSP (U.S. Army Military Police
School, 2010) instructs officers to do the following, “Once the shooter opens fire,
immediate action needs to be taken. First responding patrolman/CSG need to rapidly
proceed in a tactically sound manner to the suspect and stop the threat” (p. 27).
According to Army Field Manual 21-75 (U.S. Department of the Army, 1984),
the best method for moving while under direct fire is to minimize exposure by seeking
cover and concealment and moving from one covered position to another. When
moving, individuals should only stay exposed 3 to 5 seconds before seeking cover.
Although this tactic was designed for armed individuals engaging other armed
individuals, unarmed civilians who are attempting to evacuate the area of an active
shooter event can also use it to help minimize casualties.
Multiple studies (After Action Report Washington Navy Yard, 2013; Capellan,
2015; Feemster, 2010; Frazzano & Snyder, 2014) illustrate how agencies have
incorporated updated training into their active shooter operational plan, as well as
included specified training for 911 dispatchers or communication officers, which is
missing from the TSP (U.S. Army Military Police School, 2010). The communication
officer training curriculum was added after learning from past events, which
demonstrated the importance of having properly trained operators when taking
information about an active shooter.
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On several occasions, callers reported that operators were following a script that
was not relevant to an active shooter event, which resulted in delayed reporting time to
law enforcement officers and information gaps (Careless, 2015). When communication
officers fail to gather critical information about the shooter or the event, it exacerbates the
victims’ problems and it will also place the first responders in significant danger.
According to the Police Executive Research Forum (2014), information operators are
trained to solicit the following from a caller,
These lists include questions about the description and location of the shooter or
shooters, the types of weapons involved, the caller’s exact location, the number of
people at the location, how many people are injured, whether the shooter was
carrying anything or seemed to be wearing body armor, whether the shooter said
anything, whether the shooter took any hostages, and so on. (p. 12)
According to IAED (2017), an emergency dispatch active shooter threat
information protocol should provide the following, (a) quick notification of call
classification to responding officers; (b) accurate and critical scene safety information
(number of shooters and location updates, secondary issues such as bombs, snipers,
hostage taking, etc.); (c) escaping suspects (directions, mode of escape, assistance
rendered, etc.); (d) a large group of people moving in and out of the area and anticipated
effects; (e) safety for responders at triage area, traffic patterns, giving lifesaving
instructions to callers for evacuation, when possible, or lockdown instructions when
necessary. Along with the previous mentioned updates, the TSP also failed to discuss
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ways to provide better and faster medical services to the victims, despite that the civilian
sector has adopted and modified the U.S. Department of Defense combat medic model to
provide better care for victims of active shooter events.
Creating and employing a practical joint service (law enforcement, fire, and EMS)
response and management plan to an active shooter event requires changes to current
paradigms. However, society has been conditioned to believe that active shooter events
are primarily a law enforcement issue, instead of recognizing it as an all-hazards problem
that requires a holistic response from multiple first responder disciplines (Christensen &
Lægreid, 2014). The paradigm shift, although necessary, will be difficult to achieve
because of the organizational culture of each discipline. However, it is possible to
develop a coordinated response effort. For such an effort to occur, leaders at all levels,
including elected officials, must buy-in to the new model (Christensen & Lægreid, 2014).
In multiple updated guidelines, federal, state, and local agencies have
incorporated the Tactical Emergency Casualty Care concept into their active shooter
response guideline. The program is based on the military’s Tactical Combat Casualty
Care program, developed to help prevent the leading causes of preventable deaths. Jones,
Kue, Mitchell, Eblan, and Dyer (2014) emphasized that law enforcement and medical
personnel are collaborating during active shooter events by emulating how the military
use medical personnel (medics) during combat missions. Combat medics are accustomed
to treating victims in a hostile environment or in a hot zone. The report (Mitchell, Eblan,
& Dyer, 2014) described how the Military Police Corps and the Medical Corps could
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incorporate their wartime collaboration into the TSP. For example, during combat
deployments, medical personnel are embedded with combat and combat support units, or
members of the unit are cross trained as combat medical personnel. A similar partnership
may help save lives during an active shooter event (Mitchell, Eblan, & Dyer, 2014).
Although this phenomenological study primarily pertained to how law
enforcement respond to and manage an active shooter event, the study would be
incomplete if I did not examine how law enforcement and other government agencies, at
all levels, instruct potential victims to react during an active shooter event. Federal, state,
and local law enforcement agencies throughout the United States embrace the current
paradigm of Run, Hide, and Fight (Implementing an active shooter training program,
2015). Although that paradigm appears to be appropriate, data from multiple active
shooter events (Your Emergency Action Plan & Active Shooter Scenarios, 2014; Wands,
2016; Weber, 2016) suggest the RHF paradigm is not the best course of action during an
active shooter event. In its application, RHF is not realistic because the data from active
shooter events illustrated how multiple victims were shot while attempting to flee the
area, while hiding when the suspect located them and gained access to the room, or they
were simply shot through a door (U.S. Department of Justice, 2014; Wands, 2016;
Weber, 2016). Active shooters are constantly changing their tactics, making it a
necessity for first responders, communities, and other government agencies to change
their active shooter prevention and response tactics (U.S. Department of Justice, 2014).
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The Run portion of RHF is flawed because it recommends that victims should run
away while a shooter is firing indiscriminately with the intent to kill or injury as many
people as possible. Running is not the best course of action because no human is faster
than a speeding bullet and being exposed to a shooter for more than 5 seconds increases
the chance of getting shot. According to Army doctrine, FM 21-75 (U.S. Department of
the Army, 1984), moving under direct fire should be done in 3 to 5 second rushes to limit
your exposure, which will make the individual a more difficult target. The Hide premise is
based on the fact that the shooter cannot find his victims, which means fewer targets.
However, when the victims are located by the shooter, they are usually found in an
unhardened room (not protected against small arms fire) with only one entrance and exit,
which results in multiple deaths.
In 2013, Blair et al. reviewed 84 active shooter events that occurred between
2000 and 2010 and revealed that in approximately half of the shootings, the active
shooter had been stopped prior to the arrival of law enforcement by suicide, shot, or
subdued by victims. Although the Run and Hide options may be a more politically
correct answer to a complex problem, the analyzed data from past active shooter events
does not suggest they are the best courses of action. According to the FBI (U.S.
Department of Justice, 2014), most active shooter events last two minutes or less,
which suggest that it is highly unlikely that law enforcement first responders will arrive
at the scene, on a consistent basis, and early enough to halt the shooter’s aggression and
significantly reduce the casualties. For example, during the 2009 Fort Hood active
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shooter event, it took law enforcement personnel a total of 4 minutes and 10 second to
neutralize the shooter. However, prior to him being shot by law enforcement, the
shooter had killed 13 people and wounded 43 others (U.S. Department of the Army,
2010).
Military Police Active Shooter Response
Frazzano and Snyder (2014) found security gaps within law enforcement
organizations that may have a disastrous affect during an active shooter event. Some of
the law enforcement security concerns raised by the researchers were evident in the
Military Police Corps’ response to the 2009 Fort Hood active shooter event. For
example, prolonged combat deployments for more than a decade prevented in-service
type of training, which is used to maintain proficiency in police operations. Army
organizations (commanders) are required to develop and submit training schedules to
their higher headquarters on a quarterly basis with the intent of illustrating the type of
training they are doing to stay proficient in their assigned missions. After the Columbine
active shooter event, the New York Police Department and other law enforcement
agencies changed the way they responded to active shooter events (Frazzano & Snyder,
2014).
Since the 2009 Fort Hood active shooter event, the U.S. Department of the Army
and the Military Police Corps have dedicated a significant amount of resources and
energy toward refining force protection. The force protection refinements were intended
to provide a safer environment for the military community and the countless number of
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visitors to Army installations (Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 2010). After the 2009
Fort Hood shooting, the U.S. Department of Defense and Congress conducted an
investigation to determine how to better protect the military community, which became
known as the Fort Hood Recommendations (AIT, 2010).
Active shooter events are easily planned, have little overhead, and are highly
difficult to prevent, which are several reasons why active shooters are a common tactic
used by terrorists (domestic and international) and other criminals (Barnes, 2012).
Although they may be easily planned and executed, the intricacies involved in stopping
and responding to an active shooter are highly complex. Protecting the public from an
active shooter is a multifaceted operation and stopping the threat is the first of three
primary objectives first responders should have when responding to an active shooter
event (Frazzano & Snyder, 2014).
The subsequent components are synchronization, which is important for ensuring
a unified command; and the aftermath, which includes conducting the investigation, after
action reviews, implementing procedural changes, and healing the community (Capellan,
2015). Active shooters, regardless of their motivation, usually prepare and carry-out their
attacks in a similar manner. Because of their complexity and deadly potential, these
events represent a severe hazard to the population and an operational quagmire for
government official at the local, state, and federal levels (Capellan, 2015).
Since 2009, the Military Police Corps has made significant advances at improving
their law enforcement capabilities, which include responding to and managing active
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shooter events. The Military Police Corps has implemented several major programs
aimed at mitigating the effects of an active shooter, such as (a) requiring all law
enforcement personnel and security guards to receive active shooter response training
annually; (b) positioning Site on Wheels on major Army installations to patch together
different communications systems and serve as a backup or replacement repeater that
allows military police to communicate with local law enforcement officers; and (c)
instituting the Automated Installation Entry program, which is used to screen individuals’
criminal background history when they enter military installations (Secretary of Defense
Memorandum, 2010).
Policing Strategy
Systematic reviews of policing policies and training curriculum are a vital
component of any law enforcement organization and should not be neglected (Telep &
Weisburd, 2014). According to Telep and Weisburd (2014), a holistic review also
consists of policing strategies and funding to help the advancement of scientific
knowledge. The Military Police Corps is in the process of transitioning from a reactive
policing strategy to a predictive strategy. Predictive policing is the practice of
anticipating criminal activity, recognizing and assessing criminal trends with the
intention of eliminating, or mitigating by fusing criminal intelligence and law
enforcement operations (Harmon, 2009). When used, predictive policing prevents crime
and allows law enforcement personnel to respond more effectively while optimizing
finite resources (Harmon, 2009). The objective of predictive policing is to change the
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paradigm of law enforcement by understanding the decision-making process of criminals
(e.g., drug dealers, gang members, and terrorists) to gain a unique opportunity for
prevention, mitigation, and intelligence-based deployment. The end result is preventing
crime, preserving the public’s health and safety, and protecting first responders from
injury while they carry out their mission (Saunders, Hunt, & Hollywood, 2016).
Collaborating with civilian law enforcement agencies and implementing some of their
best practiced policies may enhance the Military Police Corps’ law enforcement
capabilities.
Collaborations and Coordination: The Whole of Government Approach
The active shooter events that occurred at Columbine High School and Virginia
Tech University are some of the deadliest active shooter incidents that have occurred in
the United States since 1984 (Los Angeles Times, 2016). Although they are not the
worst events that have occurred, they are arguably the two events that have had the most
significant influence on shaping law enforcement active shooter preparedness policies.
The Virginia Tech shooting demonstrated to the law enforcement community and
administrators that updated training and polices were needed to help prevent and mitigate
the actions of an active shooter (DiMaria, 2012). The Virginia Tech shooting also
motivated law makers to pass additional laws to help combat active shooters. In 2010,
Virginia’s governor signed into law SB 60S and HB 1238, which require senior
administrators of public universities to verify their understanding and comprehension of
the institution’s crisis and emergency plan and to conduct a yearly emergency exercise
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(DiMaria, 2012). The Columbine shooting made law enforcement realize that faster law
enforcement and medical response is needed for active shooter events (Mission Manager,
2015). In addition, law enforcement realized the need to change the current paradigm of
responding to an active shooter event and securing the perimeter to wait for the SWAT
team to arrive and take control of the situation (Mission Manager, 2015).
Action reports from both events (Governor’s Columbine Review Commission
Report, 2001; Virginia Tech, 2007) suggested that active shooter events require
multiagency collaboration and coordination because an active shooter event can be highly
complex and overwhelming for a single organization. In addition an active shooter event
requires decision makers to take in consideration their organization’s operational
capabilities, which include size, budget, and proficiency to accomplish certain task when
developing an active shooter preparedness policy.
Although years of data from numerous authors (Brunk, 2016; Kapucu et al., 2010;
Shan, Wang, Li, & Chen, 2012) illustrate the advantage of having a multiagency
collaboration agreement to assist with an emergency management event, the TSP has
only one paragraph in the whole document (195 pages) dedicated to collaborating with
external agencies to mitigate active shooter events. The TSP was created to help the
Military Police Corps manage active shooter events, and should therefore provide more
details about multiagency collaboration (U.S. Army Military Police School, 2010). In
addition, multiagency collaboration will result in substantial cost savings in services, a
higher capacity, and enhancements to service proficiency and quality.
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Zeemering and Delabbio (2013) argued that a certain level of trust between
government entities is required before a collaborative framework of shared responsibility
can be initiated and executed at a high-level of expertise. The researchers suggested that
emergency planning exercises between agencies are essential if they are to function as a
cohesive unit during real-world emergencies. The Whole of Government (WoG)
approach represents various government agencies (federal, state, and local) and private
organizations working together by crossing their predetermined boundaries to respond to
a specific problem that is affecting, or has the potential to affect, the general public.
Formal collaboration agreements between organizations are preferred but not required.
However, many government entities and private organizations have formal agreements to
assist each other during emergencies; past disasters have shown that formal agreements
are advantageous for each organization prior to an emergency (Kapucu et al., 2010).
Formal agreements can mitigate cost, help save lives, and diminish the duplication of
effort, which is a possibility when multiple jurisdictions respond to the same disaster
(Frazzano & Snyder, 2014).
With the prevalence of active shooter events in 21st century society, along with
the amount of destruction they cause (economic, psychological, and physical), the WoG
strategy presents the best course of action to prevent and lessen the destruction caused by
an active shooter. The WoG strategy is an all-inclusive strategy involving insights from
other social sciences to help address problems that may overlap between organizational
boundaries (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). Although the WoG concept was first
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introduced in 1997 (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007), several organizations throughout the
country, including hospitals, private businesses, small police forces, and small
government administrations, would significantly benefit from creating an active shooter
preparedness plan (Wands, 2016). Because of the steady rise in active shooter events, the
events appear to be a preferred mode of attack by criminals and terrorist (Lankford,
2016).
Although the WoG approach appears to be one of the best courses of action for
active shooter response, it does not guarantee that law enforcement personnel will
respond in time to neutralize the threat. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (2012), the vast majority of all active shooter events were concluded prior to the
arrival of law enforcement personnel, which is not necessarily because of incompetence.
Ergenbright and Hubbard (2012) argued the response to an active shooter event, by law
enforcement personnel, is limited because of the nature of active shooter events.
Ergenbright and Hubbard (2012) stated, “law enforcement capability to reduce the rate of
kill in active shooter scenarios is limited by the separation of time and space between the
threat and first responders at the outset of the incident” (p. 30).
The successful implantation of the WoG concept is predicated on the belief that
law enforcement agencies and the communities (businesses, schools, religious
organizations, and citizens) they serve will have an open dialogue with each other.
According to Frazzano and Snyder (2014), recent active shooter events strengthen the
need for a paradigm shift in active shooter preparedness training if current models do not
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incorporate the whole community concept, which argues that law enforcement, other
government agencies, and communities must have an interdependent relationship to keep
their communities safe. For example, communities must be willing to relay information
about possible attacks to authorities before they occur because prevention will always
save more lives than reacting after an attack has commenced. Conversely, government
and law enforcement officials must update the different stakeholders on a continual basis
regarding the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures pertaining to active shooter
preparedness.
Several researchers (McCarthy, 2014; Nardi, 2015; Rizvi & Kelly, 2015; Wands,
2016) addressed the active shooter problem through a multitude of qualitative
methodologies and each investigation added value to the problem by addressing multiple
security and operational gaps. The investigators identified different gaps within the
literature, including inadequate training time and realistic scenarios, improper equipment
for first responders, lack of coordination and cooperation between other government
agencies and the community, and insufficient training for law enforcement support staff.
The researchers addressed these gaps in their research, thus reducing the gap in
knowledge (McCarthy, 2014; Nardi, 2015; Rizvi & Kelly, 2015; Wands, 2016). A
review of the Military Police Corps’ TSP revealed that all of the security and operational
gaps identified by McCarthy (2014), Nardi (2015), Rizvi and Kelly (2015), and Wands
(2016) exist within the Military Police Corps’ active shooter preparedness plan.
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When discussing the WoG concept for active shooter preparedness, the legislative
bodies (state and federal) have an important part within the WoG concept; however, little
discussion has occurred regarding the requirement a legislative body has in active shooter
preparedness. According to Brennan (2012), during the past 30 years, few laws have
been passed to help mitigate the effects of an active shooter. In 2013, President Obama
attempted to lobby Congress to reinstate the ban on assault weapons (Feith, 2013).
President Clinton originally signed the ban into law in 1994, which outlawed 19 types of
military-style assault weapons, such as AK-47, Uzis, and TEC-9s, and ammunition
magazines that held more than 10 rounds (Feith, 2013). In 2004, the ban expired thus
making the military-style assault weapons legal to purchase (Feith, 2013). Assault
weapons are not the only weapons used by active shooters, but reinstating the ban may
help prevent future active shooters from legally purchasing military-style assault
weapons.
Although a limited number of laws have been enacted to help mitigate the active
shooter phenomenon, some laws aid active shooters, mitigating efforts. For example,
President Obama sign into law legislation S.2840, which authorized local law
enforcement agencies and emergency responders to use federal funds for active shooter
preparedness training. In addition, the law allows state and local law enforcement
agencies to hire additional officers (Lankford, 2016). After the Virginia Tech shooting of
2007, which was the third most severe mass shooting in U.S. history, President George
W. Bush signed into law the National Instant Criminal Background Check Improvement
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Act, which enhanced the National Instant Criminal Background Check System by
expanding the type of individuals who are federally prohibited to own firearms (Price &
Norris, 2008). Such individuals include those adjudicated mentally defective individuals,
unlawful users of or those who are addicted to a controlled substance, and individuals
who have been committed to a mental institution. The act allotted funding to states to
expand their own firearms reporting programs (Price & Norris, 2008).
Mandatory Training
As of August 2016, the Army had approximately 190 military occupation
specialties, each one requires soldiers to conduct a certain amount of mandatory training
to stay proficient or certified in their particular vocation. Professional training standards
and certifications are key components for any professional organization, regardless of the
industry; however, when training requirements become more of a hindrance to an
organization than value added, it may be time for senior leaders to re-think their current
worldview on mandatory training (Wong & Gerras, 2015). Wong and Gerras (2015)
argued the Army is inundated with non-mission essential training requirements, which
places a significant burden on commanders and their soldiers. The training requirements
prohibit the commanders from accomplishing their day-to day mission essential tasks to
industry standards, thus creating gaps in performance.
According to Wong and Gerras (2015),
External pressure on commanders (throughout the chain of command) to report
that 100% of their members have met the annual training requirements makes
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deceitful reporting from junior and mid-level commanders a common occurrence
in the Army. The practice is well known by leaders at all levels, even though they
are reluctant to admit it. (p. 45)
Changing the mindset of civilians and military leaders may be a difficult task because this
has been the culture for several decades; however, the first step is for leaders to
acknowledge that a problem exists with the current training methodology, which is a
significant obstacle to overcome. A change in methodology would require senior leaders
(civilians and military) to show restraint when contemplating future training requirements
and it would also require them to accept a higher degree of risk by reducing current
training requirements (Wong & Gerras, 2015).
Between 2001 and 2012, there have been three significant studies (Headquarters,
U.S. Department of the Army, 2001; U.S. Department of the Army Inspector General
Report, 2012; Wong, 2002) conducted on the amount of mandatory training requirements
imposed throughout the Army ranks. Each of the reports showed the force was inundated
with training requirements, which had a negative effect of force readiness. However,
Wong (2002) illustrated the seriousness of the problem by highlighting that commanders
had only 256 available training days (because of weekends, federal holidays, and Army
holidays) to fit 297 days of mandatory requirements.
The more recent report conducted by the U.S. Department of the Army Inspector
General Office (2012) scrutinized the bombardment of mandatory training requirements
involved in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process. The researchers noted:
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“At none (0 of 16) of the locations inspected were companies in the ARFORGEN process
able to complete all mandatory training and administrative tasks during ARFORGEN
which impacts their ability to lead effectively and take care of Soldiers (Lying Too
Ourselves, 2015 p 4).” The three reports exemplify the injurious effect training can have
on force readiness when not properly managed.
Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I reviewed the literature pertaining to managing an active shooter
incident from a first responder perspective. I also reviewed literature regarding courses
of action for how to react during an active shooter event for individuals who are victims
of an active shooter event. The IAD framework was used as a guiding theoretical
framework for this research. This framework focused on the operational level because its
main goal is to determine how individuals collectively make decisions about day-to-day
activities.
The IAD is relevant because senior law enforcement commanders have the ability
to affect change within the organizational structure, which may hinder or advance the
Military Police Corps’ law enforcement evolution. In addition, the phenomenological
methodology gave the participant pool (military police officers) a chance to voice their
views on their organizations’ active shooter management plan. Responding to an active
shooter event can present multiple problems for first responders because of the
unpredictability and complexity of an active shooter. The literature illustrated that first
responders who are well trained, properly equipped, and collaborate with adjacent
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jurisdictions on active shooting training are better prepared to manage an active shooter
event. In addition, the literature also highlighted that the current course of action for
victims reacting to an active shooter may be flawed.
Although the literature on active shooter response and management is
comprehensive, few studies pertain to military law enforcement agencies and their
management of active shooter events. The lack of research presents a serious gap within
the literature. In Chapter 3, I discussed the methodology used to determine the best
course of action for managing and reacting to an active shooter event.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
A phenomenology research method is designed to highlight issues related to a
phenomenon and ascertain how the participants in the situation perceived it. Generally, a
researcher’s goal is to uncover the essence of the participant’s lived experiences and align
his or her investigation with a comprehensible phenomenological structure (Hays, Wood,
Dahl, & Kirk-Jenkins, 2016). I used the phenomenology approach to evaluate how the
Military Police Corps manage an active shooter event. In using the design, I focused on
participants’ everyday life experiences. I attempted to understand law enforcement
officers’ observations, viewpoints, and understanding of how their unit manages, or plans
to manage, an active shooter event.
Law enforcement agencies prepare for active shooter incidents in accordance with
their resources, jurisdiction, authority, and societal perceptions. The Military Police
Corps is similar to other law enforcement agencies, but because of cultural norms, the
authoritative variable is amplified significantly, which may be a detriment or advantage
to active shooter preparedness training. To determine the effectiveness of the Army’s
active shooter preparedness training, I examined the Military Police Corps’ policies and
procedures for active shooter preparedness and compared them to civilian law
enforcement policies and procedures.
Chapter 3 includes an overview of the research method I used in conducting my
investigation. In the research design and rationale section, I discuss the
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phenomenological approach and explain why it was a good design for this study. The
research question is also restated and the role of the researcher discussed. Finally, the
chapter includes the methodology that I followed in collecting and analyzing study data.
Research Design and Rationale
Researchers who use a phenomenological design are striving to understand a
concept from the individual’s subjective vantage point (Hays et al., 2016), which requires
the researcher to lay aside her or his present understandings of a phenomenon to
genuinely investigate the participants’ experiences. Approaches for collecting and
analyzing data within phenomenological research include, but are not limited to, in-depth
semistructured interviews, focus groups, and artifact collection (Flynn & Korcuska,
2017). My data sources consisted of interviews I conducted with the 15 participants and
military police training records.
According to Matua and Van Der Wal (2015), researchers typically use the
descriptive approach to explain poorly understood features of experiences. By
comparison, the interpretive approach is used to scrutinize related features of an
experience relative to other stimuli such as culture, gender, employment or well-being of
people or groups experiencing the phenomenon. I used an interpretative
phenomenological model to assess the Military Police Corps’ active shooter preparedness
program, which will include a comprehensive review of training, equipment, policies,
coordination, and collaboration with other law enforcement agencies, and the decisionmaking process.
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Research Question
This phenomenological study was based on the following research question. How
can civilian law enforcement policing strategies help improve the Military Police Corps’
response to an active shooter? I developed the research question to determine if senior
leaders are using the latest industry standards to help improve the Military Police Corps’
active shooter preparedness plan. The interview questions were designed to understand
how police agencies integrate their active shooter strategic and tactical objectives with
their training, collaborations, and technology. The answers to the research question were
obtained through telephone interviews and agency written documentation on the subject
of training and policies.
Role of the Researcher
I spent an extensive amount of time interviewing the participants and my findings
are based on the data from these interviews. I was responsible for the entire
phenomenological study, which included organizing the interviews and selecting the
participants. I designed the interview questions, created and provided the consent form to
the participants, and was available to answer any questions or concerns the participants
had. In addition, I transcribed all of the data. As a retired military police officer (who
served for 22 years) and a current senior protection policy analyst (employed at the
Pentagon as a law enforcement, antiterrorism, and emergency management subject matter
expert), I have many preconceived ideas about my topic. To avoid bias, I used a
standardized set of questions that supports the overall research question. For
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transparency, I recorded all interviews, transcribed them, and provided the participants an
electronic copy of their responses (within 48 hours of the interview). The participants
received a copy of their responses to validate the accuracy of my transcription.
Methodology
I conducted interviews with the framework of interpretative phenomenological
methodology, which guided the process. According to Starks and Trinidad (2007),
interviews are one of the main tools used for data collection in a qualitative research
design. I used interviews to collect evidence on the experiences of the participants and
their comprehension of the experiences. The interviews were semistructured and include
open-ended questions, as suggested by Reid et al. (2005).
Prior to conducting any interviews, I obtained approval from Walden’s University
Institutional Review Board (IRB). After obtaining IRB approval, I interviewed multiple
military law enforcement personnel (at various levels) by telephone. This qualitative
research, I concluded, was consistent with eliciting a complex, detailed understanding of
how the Military Police Corps is using it resources to prevent or mitigate active shooting
incidents, which was the focus of this investigation. The interviewees consisted of three
senior Military Police Corps leaders (Pay Grade 05 through 06), midlevel leaders (Pay
Grade E-7 through 04), junior leaders (Pay Grade E-5 through E-6), junior soldiers (Pay
Grade E-1 through E-4) and three Department of the Army Civilian Police Officers
(junior grade). The participants came from five military police battalions. I selected the
five battalions because of their geographic locations and size. I employed a snowball
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sampling methodology by enlisting current military police officers whom I served with
while on active duty status to join the participant pool. Afterwards, participants were
asked to recommend coworkers whom they believed would be a good fit (i.e., who had
significant experience in law enforcement operations and met the following criteria:
senior Military Police Corps leaders [Pay Grade 05 through 06], midlevel leaders [Pay
Grade E-7 through 04], junior leaders [Pay Grade E-5 through E-6], junior soldiers [Pay
Grade E-1 through E-4], or Department of the Army Civilian Police Officers [junior
grade]). As a contingency plan, I would have used the social media platforms LinkedIn
and Facebook to solicit additional participants.
Prior to conducting interviews, participants received consent forms for their
review and signature. The informed consent form detailed the phenomenological study’s
purpose, my contact information, and issues of confidentiality between the participants
and the investigator. The form also addressed potential risks to the participants.
For this research, no real names were used and each participant was assigned
numbers and aliases to protect their privacy and for de-identification purposes. The data
was collected via telephonic interviews. Each interview lasted approximately 30
minutes. Because of the participant pool was geospatially disbursed, I used telephonic
interviews for this phenomenological study. The interview questions (see Appendix A)
were devised so participants could explain how they would improve active shooter
response in their organization, how they would improve collaboration between law
enforcement and the military community for active shooter preparedness training, and
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how the military police culture hinders or enhances the Military Police Corps’ active
shooter preparedness plan. I developed this instrument based on literature sources (e.g.,
Barnes, 2012; Blair, Nichols, Burns, & Curnutt, 2013; Schweit, 2014; Borelli, 2013;
IAED 2017) and my personal experience and training as a retired military police officer.
To record the interviews, I used a digital recorder.
The first step in establishing content validity is recognizing bias tendencies and
ensuring they do not affect the development of the research and interview questions.
Second, ethical recruiting assisted with content validity because data collected from
representatives of the targeted population, with the required knowledge and experience,
led to valid results. Finally, I used respondent validation by summarizing the data and
having the participants review my findings, which allowed the participants to critically
analyze the findings to confirm that the data is authentic and recognizable. To support
data sufficiency, information was gathered from multiple perspectives (locations and
groups within the same industry), which is known as triangulation.
Data management in qualitative research consists of coding, data storage,
interpretation, and presentation (Smith & Firth, 2011). Data management is an
indispensable part of the research process, which should be in place prior to the start of
any research project (Smith & Firth, 2011). To assist with coding, data storage, and
interpretation, I used NVivo 10 by QSR International. I transcribed the interviews into
NVivo to organize, label, and stamp the data with the date and time. I used axial and
open coding. Throughout the open coding phase, I examined words or phrases and sorted
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them into groups; during axial coding, I linked groups to subgroups by concentrating on
the affiliation between the different categories.
According to Starks and Trinidad (2007), qualitative research is intrinsically
idiosyncratic because the investigator is the primary research tool and the decision maker
in regards to coding, thematizing, and contextualization. In any type of research,
integrity is an important characteristic for an investigator to have, but in a
phenomenological study, the integrity of the researcher is “center stage” because of the
subjective nature (Starks & Trinidad, 2007). To assist with validity, all interviews were
recorded (via digital recorder) with the consent of the interviewees, and each transcribed
response was stored under lock and key. The discussions followed a designed worksheet
to help maintain uniformity between members of the sampling pool.
After completion of the interviews, I transferred the documents and acoustic files
to NVivo 10 for analysis and information management. I stored the data on a flash drive
and secured it in my home safe. Triangulation of sources established credibility and
allow me to gain a comprehensive understanding of the topic studied. The different data
sources consisted of interviewing people at different locations, in multiple positions, and
with different experiences.
I used snowball sampling to identify the participant pool from the five preselected
Army installations. With the support from literature sources, I developed questions to
address the gap in literature. I conducted snowball sampling by contacting a former
coworker who is still an active duty military police officer. I asked him to recommend
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other participants for this phenomenological study. I explained the purpose of this
phenomenological study, interview procedures, and the confidentiality issue of storing all
data collected in a secure place. The participants were assured that their personal
identification information would not be shared in the written report or verbally.
The final point I explained before the interviews started was the consent form. I
explained the form in its entirety and asked each participant verbally if they understood
the form. After verbal conformation, I asked the participant to sign the form (the forms
were emailed to the participants). After the forms were signed, I reminded each
participant that he or she could withdraw from this phenomenological study at any time
and for any reason. I used a semistructured format and allowed the participants a
significant amount of time to explain their personal experiences with this phenomenon.
During and after the interview phase, I requested clarification from multiple
participants, regarding words, phrases, or experiences they shared. This technique is
known as member checking. Member checking is used in qualitative research to allow
research participants to double-check the information they shared with the researcher
(Carlson, 2010). I took notes during the interviews to record the following actions of the
participants: emotions, and lack of emotions. In addition, I recorded my personal
thoughts or observations related to the participants’ reactions during the interview. After
completion of the interviews, I reviewed the audiotapes and my personal notes to ensure
accuracy. All data was stored in NVivo––software designed to support qualitative
research––and then saved to a password protected thumb drive and secured in my home
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safe. All participants had an opportunity to review their initial interview to verify
accuracy (member check) of language, meaning, and views. Each participant received a
copy (via email) of the transcript pertaining to his or her interview.
Summary
Through this qualitative phenomenological study, I investigated the philosophies
that guide the Military Police Corps’ views on active shooter preparedness training and
the influence of those policies on the military and civilian community. A
phenomenology theoretical framework guided this study because it allowed the
investigator to use a phenomenological approach, which is a requirement when seeking
answers for problems of this nature (Weed, 2005). I pinpointed the rank and file
members’ perceptions of their active shooter preparedness training. Although these
accounts were subjective, they were valuable because they came with an insiders’
viewpoints. This chapter presented the framework of this phenomenological study, data
collection, data management and analysis, validity and reliability, and the role of the
investigator.
I asked 15 law enforcement personnel, including senior leaders, mid-level leaders,
junior leaders, junior officers, and DA civilian police officers, to participate in the study.
Before the commencement of this phenomenological study, all participants had time to
ask questions, read, and sign the informed consent form. I transferred all documents and
acoustic files to NVivo 10 for analysis and information management; the data was stored
on a secure and password-protected thumb drive. I analyzed and grouped the data
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according to themes identified during the analysis phase. In Chapter 4, I discussed the
findings of the research, themes, and analysis.

64
Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
In this chapter I present the findings of this study. The purpose of the study was
to determine the effectiveness of the Army’s active shooter preparedness training by
examining its policies and procedures and comparing them to civilian law enforcement
policies and procedures for active shooter preparedness. I sought to answer the following
research question: How can civilian law enforcement policing strategies help improve the
response of the Military Police Corps to an active shooter? Phone interviews gave me the
opportunity to examine the lived experiences of the participants.
Setting
The geographic setting for this study consisted of locations throughout the United
States and Europe. I used telephone interviews in the study because of the geospatial
location of the participants. During the phone interviews, participants shared their
knowledge and experience about active shooter preparedness. All participants were
encouraged to speak openly about their experiences. I conducted interviews at various
times and dates at the participants’ convenience. The participants were made up of
Military Police soldiers and Department of the Army Civilian Police personnel. A
comprehensive description including positions of key participants cannot be divulged
because it may lead to their identification. The participants consisted of senior Military
Police Corps leaders, midlevel leaders, junior leaders, and junior soldiers.
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Demographics
The 15 participants interviewed for this study came from various military police
units throughout the United States and Europe. (Eight participants were from the same
organization.) Each participant reported that she or he had been involved in a live active
shooter preparedness exercise at some point in her or his career. I asked demographic
questions about gender, age, rank, job title, and educational level (see Appendix B). The
15 participants were of various ages, races, genders, ranks, and educational levels (see
Table 1). Eight volunteers were excluded from this study because they did not meet the
explicit criteria.
Table 1
Participant Demographics
Participant
MP1
MP2
MP3
MP4
MP5
MP6
MP7
MP8
MP9
MP10
MP11
MP12
MP13
MP14
MP15

Age

Rank

Race

Gender

46
45
29
48
44
38
33
27
25
33
30
31
40
39
42

0-6
0-5
E-4
0-6
GS7
GS7
GS9
E-4
E-4
O-4
E-4
GS9
0-5
GS9
GS12

White
White
Black
White
Hispanic
Hispanic
White
White
Black
Black
Hispanic
White
White
Black
White

Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Female
Female
Female
Male
Male
Female
Male
Male
Female

Education
level
MA
MA
AD
MA
AD
HS
MA
AD
HS
MA
BA
MA
MA
HS
HS

Note. HS = high school; AD = associate’s degree; BA = bachelor’s degree; MA =
master’s degree.
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Data Collection
I conducted the interviews over a 12-day period and asked each participant 10
questions, which took approximately 30 minutes to answer. Prior to the start of the
interviews, the consent form was discussed, and I informed the participants that they had
the option to discontinue the interview at any time without any negative consequences. I
used a digital recorder to record each interview, with permission from each participant.
The participants were informed that the interviews would be anonymous and, to ensure
their anonymity, their names were replaced (randomly) with alphanumeric characters.
Data Analysis
After completing the interviews, I transcribed the digital recordings verbatim and
uploaded them into the NVivo 10 software. I selected this software so that the data from
the interviews could be analyzed to categorize themes and patterns that emerged from the
responses to the interview questions. Using the software, I was able to compile phrases
into related groups. By evaluating the participants’ replies to the interview questions, I
was able to demonstrate the relationship between related patterns and themes. Each
interview question was open-ended and designed to invoke replies specific to the research
design and focus.
The phenomenological method was most appropriate for this type of research
because there is very little research on active shooter preparedness for the military law
enforcement community (see Chapters 1 and 2). Use of this methodology permitted me
to classify a participant’s experience and categorize a similarly experienced phenomenon
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shared by the participants, such as the lack of quality training time, inadequate
equipment, subpar leadership, and lack of community outreach (on active shooter
preparedness).
During data interpretation, the following themes emerged from the participant
responses: (a) local community not adequately trained in active shooter preparedness, (b)
inadequate joint active shooter preparedness training with local law enforcement, (c)
inferior or inadequate equipment (ballistic shields and breaching tools), and (d)
insufficient training for law enforcement (first responders) and emergency dispatchers.
Although the themes did not start developing until the conclusion of the data collection
and interpretation, the answers they provided were expected. In 2016, the Department of
Defense (DoD) published Instructions 5525.15 (Law Enforcement Standards and
Training in the Department of Defense), and it illustrated how DoD’s new law
enforcement standards will be similar to civil law enforcement training standards.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
According to Shenton (2016), research trustworthiness centers on establishing
dependability, credibility, confirmability, and transferability. Each characteristic plays a
significant and equal part in providing trustworthiness in a qualitative study.
Credibility
For the assertion of trustworthiness in this study, I used various strategies as
authentication for the quality of the collected data. Triangulation (the corroboration of
specific themes from participants) and rapport building (discussing my relevant
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experience) strategies were used to validate the collected data (see Shenton, 2016). After
transcribing the oral interviews, I e-mailed the interview transcripts to the participants for
accuracy verification. As a retired military police officer, I was able to discuss force
protection issues and training restraints within the Military Police Corps. I believe that
this made it easier for many of the participants to establish a rapport with me, which gave
them the confidence to speak freely. Sharing their comparable experiences and views
about their organizations’ active shooter preparedness plans provided credibility.
Transferability
Transferability refers to relevance of study findings to other contexts, situations,
times, and populations (Shenton, 2016). I recruited participants from five Army
installations, and all participants were certified law enforcement personnel with various
levels of experience, education, and responsibility (from senior-level decision makers to
junior patrol personnel). Additional research conducted on this topic should use similar
demographics and questions to establish transferability.
Dependability
According to Shenton (2016), allowing the participants to repeat themselves is a
crucial part of establishing dependability. Dependability in qualitative research is defined
as the stability of data over time and over conditions. For this study, comparisons with
previous research pertained to inferior or inadequate equipment, insufficient training for
law enforcement (first responders), and emergency dispatchers, and other topics. A
researcher conducting a qualitative study tries to advance themes and responses based on
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the replies and analysis of the participants (Shenton, 2016). Within their answers,
participants expressed multiple shared experiences that transcended geography and
position.
Confirmability
This is used to substantiate that the research findings are derived from the
experience of participants and supporting documents (Shenton, 2016). Conducting this
qualitative study required a particular group of individuals with the right
phenomenological experience. I established confirmability by detailing the process of
collecting, analyzing, and interpreting the data. I also provided supporting
documentation for this research, such as training schedules from the military police units
of the participants, the Military Police Corps training support package for active shooter
preparedness, recordings and transcribed interviews, and peer-reviewed literature from
past studies.

70
Results
Interview Question Findings
Interview Question 1. What are the steps involved in your local law
enforcement’s active shooter preparedness plan? The question illustrated the
familiarization level of participants with the active shooter preparedness plan of their
local law enforcement. The responses were divided into the following categories: (a)
familiar and (b) not familiar. All participants responded to the question, and only 2 out of
the 15 participants were familiar with their respective plan.
Subtheme 1.1: Familiar. Considering that familiar and not familiar can be
subjective terms, familiar was interpreted as being able to articulate how the local police
department trains officers to respond to an active shooter event. Two participants (MP3
and MP7) from different military police units were familiar with their local police
department’s active shooter preparedness plan. They were able to explain how the local
police department trained the personnel, the type of equipment available for active
shooter events, and the training frequency. In addition, MP3 and MP7 are active duty
military police law enforcement officers who are volunteer police officers with their
respective local civilian police department. These respondents stated that their
knowledge of their local police department active shooter preparedness plan was gleaned
from their service as auxiliary/volunteer police officers with their respective local police
departments. Furthermore, they stated that their units had not conducted any joint active
shooter training with their local police departments.
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Subtheme 1.2: Not familiar. Not familiar was interpreted as not knowing how the
local police department trains officers to respond to an active shooter event. Thirteen
participants were not familiar with their local police department’s active shooter
preparedness plan. All participants stated that their units had not conducted joint active
shooter training with their local police department within the last 3 to 5 years. (Each
participant had been with her or his organization from 3 to 5 years).
Interview Question 2. What type of training do military police officers
conduct in conjunction with local law enforcement? Military police officers have a
long-standing tradition of training alongside local law enforcement officers. All 15
participants stated that their units allow all assigned military police personnel to attend
law enforcement training sponsored by civilian law enforcement agencies. Participants
reported having received the following training from civilian law enforcement agencies:
(a) interview and interrogation techniques, (b) a driving while intoxicated identification
course, (c) traffic accident investigation, (d) crime scene investigation, (e) community
policing, (f) baton, (g) chemical aerosol projector, (h) 911 dispatch, and (i) stun gun
training. When asked a follow-up question about active shooter training courses offered
by their local police organizations, 80% of the participants stated that their local agencies
offered training on active shooter response.
Interview Question 3. What are the similarities and differences between your
unit’s active shooter preparedness and local counterpart’s training? Of the 15
participants, only 2 (MP3 and MP7) had the required knowledge to compare their active
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shooter preparedness training with their local police department. The other 13
participants could not compare training criteria because their units did not conduct joint
active shooter training with their local counterparts. Participants MP3 and MP7 reported
that their agencies stated that the only similarities they saw were the following: each
agencies had a written active shooter preparedness plan that required responding officers
to advance toward the suspect as soon as they arrived on the scene and necessitated that a
supervisor had to respond to the scene and assume the position of scene commander.
MP3 stated that the local police departments’ active shooter preparedness plan
differed from his units’ active shooter preparedness plan. The plan from the local police
department contained the following topics that were missing from their units’ active
shooter plan: specialized active shooter training for 911 operators, moving under-fire
training for first responders and breaching training for first responders.
MP7 also relayed that his unit’s active shooter preparedness plan was missing,
specialized active shooter training for 911 operators, moving under-fire training for first
responders, and breaching training for first responders. In addition, MP3 and MP7 stated
that their local police departments would conduct training at different businesses
throughout their jurisdictions (they would request permission from different companies),
such as shopping malls, hospitals, grocery stores, and their own police stations. Since all
major Army installation have shopping malls (e.g. Post Exchanges), hospitals, grocery
stores (e.g. Commissaries), and police stations, the Military Police Corps’ active shooter
preparedness plan should also require active shooter preparedness training at those
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locations.
Interview Question 4. How do the military police provide training to the
military community (soldiers, family members, businesses, retirees, etc.) on how to
react if they are involved in an active shooter event? Each participant stated that none
of their units provided active shooter training to the military community (soldiers, family
members, businesses, retirees, etc.). The United States Army Military Police School
(USAMPS) has a course titled Patrol Response to Active Shooter Train-the-Trainer and it
is designed to “instruct personnel responsible for training service members in active
shooter response tactics, techniques, and procedures” (U.S. Army Fort Leonard Wood,
2019, p. 1).
Interview Question 5. What type of activities does the Military Police Corps
active shooter preparedness training entail and how regularly do they occur? All 15
participants stated that each of their units conducts some form of active shooter training.
Seven of the participants indicated that their units perform annual active shooter training,
consisting of going over different tactics (e.g. shoot, do not shoot, unit policy on
responding to an active shooter, providing first aid to the victims, room clearing
procedures, etc.) in a classroom environment. Six of the participants stated that they also
conduct training in a classroom environment, but it is not yearly (once every 2 years, 3
years, 18 months, or too infrequently to determine a set time pattern). The remaining two
participants stated that their units conducted active shooter training annually that included
practical exercises. The practical exercises consisted of active shooter training occurring
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at their urban environment-training sites.
Interview Question 6. What types of live active shooter exercises do the
military police conduct with on-post businesses and how many other organizations
are involved (fire, medical, etc.)? Each participant stated that none of their units
conducted live active shooter exercises with on-post businesses. Since the 1999
Columbine High School active shooter event, civilian police departments have updated
their active shooter preparedness plan on a continual basis. For example, civilian law
enforcement agencies, throughout the United States, are training local business owners
and other community members on how to react during an active shooter event (Harvey,
2019).
Interview Question 7. How does the Military Police Corps culture affect
active shooter preparedness training? Employees in every organization play a part in
determining the overall culture in their particular company; however, leaders have the
greatest influence on organizational culture (Heathfield, 2019). Of the 15 participants, 4
individuals (MP1, MP2, MP4, and MP10) believed that the Military Police Corps culture
is conducive for active shooter preparedness training because organizational leadership is
dedicated to providing ample training time for all law enforcement training to include
active shooter preparedness. The remaining 11 participants stated the opposite. These
respondents reported that their units did allow time for law enforcement training, but it
was inadequate. Law enforcement training was usually conducted once a year, while
training for tactical skills was scheduled for multiple times during the year.
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Interview Question 8. What type of active shooter preparedness training do
emergency dispatchers receive? Twelve participants stated that their organization did
not have specialized active shooter preparedness training for their dispatchers. The
remaining three participants indicated they were not aware of any specialized active
shooter training for dispatchers.
Interview Question 9. Under what circumstances is your organization’s
active shooter preparedness plan updated? How often does this occur? Most of the
participants, 80%, stated that they were unfamiliar with procedures to update the plan. In
addition to their knowledge, their plans had not been updated within the last three years.
The final three stated that their active shooter preparedness plans are updated yearly.
Interview Question 10. How could your organization’s active shooter
preparedness plan be improved? Eleven participants responded and each provided
similar recommendations as to how their units could improve their active shooter
preparedness plans. Respondents to this interview question stated that their organization
should increase the number of active shooting training hours conducted on an annual
basis; acquire the latest equipment, such as ballistic shields and breaching tools (only the
patrol supervisor have breaching equipment); and conduct more live exercise training
with their local civilian law enforcement agencies and business owners. In addition, four
participants stated that their organization needed to invest in a new 911 communication
system because the current systems are outdated.
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Research Question Findings
Large metropolitan police departments, such as Los Angeles, Chicago, New York
City, and Washington DC, have spent enormous amounts of time and resources on
improving their active shooter preparedness training (Maximino, 2015). Over the years,
active shooter response has evolved from the usual strategy of creating a perimeter and
standing by while specialized units respond to the scene and engage the active shooter.
Since the 1999 Columbine High School shooting, upgraded techniques (e.g. law
enforcement immediately engaging active shooters, increased training time for active
shooter preparedness, better equipment for first responders, etc.) were developed because
it became clear that the tactics had become obsolete (Maximino, 2015). The enhanced
techniques have improved active shooter preparedness training for many civilian law
enforcement agencies. Analysis of the interviews illustrated that the upgraded tactics
used by civilian law enforcement agencies for active shooter response could enhance the
active shooter preparedness plan of the Military Police Corps if they are integrated
appropriately.
Collaboration. Although years of data from numerous authors (Brunk, 2016;
Kapucu et al., 2010; Shan et al., 2012) illustrate the advantage of having a multiagency
collaboration agreement to assist with an emergency management event, the analysis of
the participants’ responses demonstrated that the value of multiagency collaboration is
not a priority for their leadership. Only 13% of the respondents stated that their units had
an effective multiagency agreement in place. Eighty-six percent of the respondents stated
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that their units did not conduct joint active shooter training with their local counterparts.
Having an effective collaboration agreement requires agencies to conduct live exercise
training on a regular basis because it could lead to a successful response, mitigation, and
recovery effort (Brunk, 2016).
Training. All of the participants reported that personnel in their units had
conducted a multitude of joint criminal justice training with their local law enforcement,
but none of it was active shooter preparedness training. According to Zeemering and
Delabbio (2013), emergency planning exercises between agencies are essential if they are
to function as a cohesive unit during real-world emergencies. Training as one cohesive
group will foster a certain level of trust and confidence between organizations, which will
be required before a collaborative framework of shared responsibility can be initiated and
executed at a high level of expertise (Zeemering & Delabbio, 2013).
While joint training is essential, an effective organizational training methodology
is paramount to maintain adequate and professional law enforcement personnel. All of
the participants stated that their organizations conduct some form of active shooter
preparedness training. Moreover, 46% indicated that their units attended annual training
in a classroom environment, while 40% reported that their units held training in a
classroom environment, but it was not on a yearly basis (between 18 months and three
years). Additionally, 13% stated that their units conducted annual active shooter training
that consisted of a classroom portion and a practical exercise in an urban environment.

78
According to Rorie (2015), a holistic and effective active shooter preparedness
plan should provide training on a regular basis. It should also conduct collaboration
training with the local community and other first responders (fire, medical, etc.) and
provide training for support staff and law enforcement personnel. Finally, it should also
regularly update previous active shooter preparedness plans.
Seventy-three percent of the participants stated that their organizations could
improve their active shooter preparedness plan by increasing the number of active
shooter training hours conducted on an annual basis. Moreover, they suggested that
the organizations should issue better equipment to the first responders, such as ballistic
shields and breaching tools (only the patrol supervisors have breaching material in
their vehicles). Finally, the participants suggested conducting more live exercise
training (with their local civilian law enforcement agencies, business owners, and
other community members). In addition, 26% stated that their organization needed to
invest in a new 911 communication system because their current systems are outdated.
Summary
Although the literature on active shooter response and management is
comprehensive, few studies pertain to military law enforcement agencies and their
management of active shooter events, according to my review of the literature. Although
the study is focused on the Army’s Military Police Corps, it will also be beneficial for the
other law enforcement agencies in DoD. In Chapter 5, I further discuss the findings. In
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addition, I consider the limitations and implications of the study, and I offer
recommendations for future research topics.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
Active shooter events continue to occur throughout the United States. Past active
shooter events including those at Fort Hood, Texas (49th Transportation Battalion, 2014);
Chattanooga, Tennessee (Chattanooga Recruitment Center, 2015); Las Vegas, Nevada
(Mandalay Bay Hotel, 2017); Parkland, Florida (Marjory Stoneman Douglas High
School, 2018); and Virginia Beach, Virginia (Virginia Beach Municipal Center, 2019)
illustrate that all law enforcement agencies need an active shooter preparedness plan that
is holistic in nature. Active shooter preparedness training is a significant issue that
requires continuous research to assist leaders and administrators with a holistic approach
to combating active shooter events. I conducted this research to examine the Military
Police Corps’ training on active shooter preparedness to determine whether it is
comparable to civilian law enforcement industry standards. I found that the Corps’
training is not comparable to civilian law enforcement industry standards.
In 2010, less than a year after the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, the U.S. Army
Military Police School released the Active Shooter Response Training Support Package
(TSP; U.S. Army Military Police School, 2010). The packet outlines several courses of
action regarding how to respond to and manage an active shooter event. Although the
TSP was a significant effort to address a highly complex problem, the packet has several
gaps that need filling. For example, the TSP contradicts updated active shooter response
training developed by federal and local law enforcement agencies by making unrealistic
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claims or expectations pertaining to officer safety and neutralizing active shooters. The
results of this study illustrate that the Corps’ current active shooter preparedness training
methodology has gaps that can be filled by incorporating civilian law enforcement
industry standards for active shooter preparedness. I plan to use the results of this
research to advocate for recommended changes that are more in line with civilian law
enforcement industry standards for active shooter preparedness.
This study progressed from the analysis of the training plan for active shooter
preparedness of the Military Police Corps to the assessment of technology, equipment,
written policies, and collaborations with internal and external organizations to combat
active shooter events. Although this study has limitations, it provides additional
information to the current active shooter preparedness literature. Although there have
been numerous studies on active shooter preparedness (Jenkins, 2017), I found no litature
that compared the Military Police Corps’ active shooter preparedness training with the
civilian law enforcements active shooter preparedness standards.
In addressing this gap in the literature, I examined the active shooter preparedness
plan of the Military Police Corps, conducted interviews, and reviewed training
documentation of five geographically dispersed organizations. Specifically, I examined
how the Military Police Corps trained and responded to an active shooter event in
comparison to civilian law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, I analyzed the
participants’ interview response to identify and address security gaps (by comparing the
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responses to civilian law enforcement industry standards for active shooter preparedness)
in the Military Police Corps’ active shooter preparedness plan.
Interpretation of the Findings
This phenomenological study addressed multiple aspects of the active shooter
preparedness plan of the Military Police Corps, such as training hours, personnel training,
equipment, collaboration, and communication. Having an appropriately trained
workforce is a vital component for any organization. Without an effective training
methodology, employees could become underqualified due to advancements in
technology, equipment, and training methodology. The results of this phenomenological
study (derived from participant responses and military police training records) affirmed
that the Military Police Corps averages 14 training hours per year on active shooter
preparedness, which is far less than the 40 hours recommended by the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (2018). Results also indicate that officers in the Corps are
not adequately equipped or appropriately trained and that they lack a comprehensive
policy that requires each Military Police Corps unit to have a standardized active shooter
preparedness plan.
Although a review of the literature confirmed that civilian police agencies have
changed the way they respond to active shooter events since the Columbine High School
shooting (Harvey, 2019), the training on active shooter preparedness of the Military
Police Corps does not reflect the major changes civilian law enforcement agencies have
adopted as standard practices for responding to active shooter events. For example,
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civilian law enforcement agencies have incorporated active shooter training that consists
of live exercises in operational environments and joint training with other fire and
medical first responders, and they developed collaboration agreements with neighboring
jurisdictions (Harvey, 2019). The updated tactics have helped law enforcement agencies
improve their active shooter preparedness program.
These changes illustrated how active shooter response tactics continue to advance,
which increases the complexity of active shooter preparedness training. In the civilian
sector, a paradigm shift in the use of medical personnel has them entering the hostile zone
before the shooter is neutralized. Such a change will require additional training for
civilian medical personnel; however, if the Military Police Corps would adopt this new
tactic, very little training would be needed since the Military Police Corps does this in a
combat environment by incorporating combat medics into military police squads. During
combat deployments, medical personnel are exposed to dangerous situations (ambushes,
active shooters, etc.) on a regular basis.
Analysis of study data demonstrates that the training methodology for the active
shooter incident preparedness plan of the Military Police Corps is limited. The
information gleaned from the research confirms that there is a significant gap between the
active shooter preparedness plans of the Military Police Corps and civilian law
enforcement. In addition, it revealed that the Military Police Corps is not motivated to
educate the military community on the best strategies needed to mitigate injuries and
death from active shooter incidents.
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According to the research results, the likelihood of a significant active shooter
event occurring within the military community increases yearly; however, it appears that
the current active shooter preparedness plan of the Military Police Corps does not address
the active shooter response holistically. The research data provided evidence that there
are multiple gaps in the active shooter preparedness plan of the Military Police Corps,
which could be addressed by incorporating the operational capabilities of civilian law
enforcement agencies.
Limitations of the Study
It was my intent to interview 15 participants (senior Military Police Corps leaders,
midlevel leaders, junior leaders, and junior soldiers) from five different military police
units. My intent was to have at least two participants from each unit so I could have
multiple responses for each unit. However, only eight participants were from the same
units (MP1 and MP5, MP2 and MP11, MP3 and MP6, and MP7 and MP15). Although
the participants were not all from the same unit, I do not believe the outcome would have
been different. This is because the seven other respondents had similar responses to the
eight participants who were from the same units.
Four limitations apply to this phenomenological study, and each limitation relates
to methodological weaknesses. The first limitation is from the result of working with a
small participant pool. Data saturation is a principal element of qualitative research.
Failing to reach it will influence the research and restrict content validity, which is
required to demonstrate that the research is valid and that it answers the research
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question. The nature of the small sample size limitation is artificially created to provide
an expedient and judicious execution of the research; however, taking participants from
large, medium, and small installations provided reasonable measures to address this
limitation.
Second, sampling specifically drawn from the U.S. Army law enforcement
population may result in groupthink responses. Armed forces and law enforcement
individuals are extremely cohesive due to their training and experiences and are trained to
solve problems as a team. These factors could make it more difficult for individuals to
voice an independent idea. Because of the research topic, selecting the sampling from the
military was a reasonable choice; however, pulling from one specific group may result in
groupthink, which could make improvement difficult. The inclusion of law enforcement
personnel with different ranks, positions, and the geospatial disbursement of the
participant pool enhanced the probability that groupthink did not occur. It is highly
unlikely that groupthink occurred during this research because several hundred miles
separated the respondents.
Third, participants may have provided erroneous information because they could
have viewed me as an outsider trying to embarrass the Military Police Corps.
Respondents who viewed me as an outsider trying to embarrass the Military Police Corps
or their units could have provided erroneous information about their unit’s active shooter
preparedness training program (embellishing on the amount of training hours allocated
for active shooter preparedness, the type of training, the type of equipment, etc.). Finally,
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disgruntled participants may provide inaccurate information because they are dissatisfied
with their employer (Disgruntled Employees, 2019). During any type of research or
investigation that requires interaction with the population, there will always be a
possibility of receiving erroneous or exaggerated information from participants due to
ulterior motives.
To address this type of limitation, I reviewed and compared the responses
received and looked for outliers that required further investigation for clarity (there wee
no outliers identified that needed further investigation). In addition to receiving
erroneous or exaggerated information from participants, investigators must also be aware
of their own biases. For example, I work as a law enforcement and antiterrorism
specialist (DoD contractor) for the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) and because
of my position, I have access to classified information, law enforcement sensitive
information, and internal memorandums and emails that are not available to the public or
to law enforcement personnel in subordinate organizations. Having access to internal
memorandums and emails that highlights the security gaps in the Military Police Corps’
active shooter preparedness program has the potential to negatively affect my objectivity.
For bias mitigation purposes, I only used documents that had been released to the public
or those that can be obtained via the Freedom of Information Act.
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Recommendations
Developing a Holistic Active Shooter Preparedness Plan
Mitigating the effects of an active shooter event requires preparation, stakeholders
engagement (with numerous agencies), and competent leadership Christensen & Lægreid,
2014). The analysis identified four main elements that stand out as fundamental
components of a holistic active shooter preparedness plan.
Technology plays a vital role in developing and maintaining an effective active shooter
preparedness plan. Active shooter events are usually over within 5 minutes or less. In
addition, having the right technology could help mitigate the influence of an active
shooter. For example, a gunshot detection system can assist law enforcement in quickly
pinpointing an active shooter.
Equipment can also be used to mitigate the loss of life by protecting first
responders during an active shooter response. Numerous civilian law enforcement
agencies provide their first responders with specific equipment that is used to assist with
an active shooter response, such as ballistic shields, breaching tools, and long barrel guns.
Written policies are used to provide guidance to employees and assist with
creating a standard level of operations throughout an organization. Civilian law
enforcement agencies have developed holistic active shooter policies that require the
entire organization to implement them at the unit level.
Collaboration between law enforcement agencies stimulates greater productivity
in service delivery and improves the role designation of other agencies. Interagency
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partnership in law enforcement can take the shape of resource sharing with another police
department to offer expert training, to plan for conceivable emergencies, and to develop
better ways to respond to calls involving large-scale emergencies.
The study identified that 12 of the participants (middle leaders, junior leaders, and
junior patrolmen) are interested in providing updated equipment to first responders and
developing a holistic standardized active shooter preparedness plan for the Military
Police Corps. They are also interested in establishing collaboration agreements with other
law enforcement agencies, increasing training hours for active shooter preparedness
training, and increasing the amount of active shooter training with live-fire exercise.
Recommendations for Future Research
There is limited research regarding the preparedness of the Military Police Corps
for an active shooter event, which suggests continual research is needed to investigate
this issue to ensure that the best response methodology is incorporated into the overall
active shooter response planning for the Military Police Corps. The study findings
determined that active shooter preparedness planning must be holistic in nature, which
includes addressing collaboration agreements with adjacent law enforcement agencies
and medical agencies. A comprehensive methodology will ensure that the active shooter
preparedness plan will address the four phases of an active shooter event, which are
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.
The examination of the active shooter preparedness plan of the Military Police
Corps found that response, training, equipment, tactics, technology, and collaboration are
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some of the areas that need additional research. The interviews implied that the active
shooter preparedness plan of the Military Police Corps is restrictive and does not reflect
the best practices from civilian law enforcement agencies for active shooter response,
such as medical collaboration, which is extremely important to the active shooter
response and therefore deserving of more analytical research.
In addition, future investigators should research the feasibility of civilian law
enforcement agencies assuming the law enforcement mission for Army installations to
determine if they can provide better service. The phenomenological framework assisted
this study by illustrating the effectiveness of the training support package for an active
shooter for the Military Police Corps at the unit level. Additional research should include
scrutiny of civilian training methodology to minimize casualties concerning active
shooter preparedness. This study demonstrated that the current active shooter
preparedness plan of the Military Police Corps lacks a provision that addresses active
shooter training for the general military population.
Expanding the examination of this subject by adding additional military police
units from other geographic locations could assist in further understanding of the active
shooter preparedness plan of the Military Police Corps. Facts gleaned from different
areas could provide wide-ranging results that may help improve the active shooter
preparedness plan of the Military Police Corps.
The researcher seeks to enlighten senior leaders within the Department of the
Army and the DoD with information that will help mitigate casualties from an active
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shooter event. In addition, the research provides a holistic approach to active shooter
preparedness that can be used by civilian law enforcement agencies.
Implications
This study can affect positive social change within the DoD and the civilian law
enforcement community by highlighting lesson learned and best course of actions from
past active shooter events that occurred. The study can assist the Military Police Corps
leadership with their decision-making process, updating their training methodology for
first responders and 911 dispatchers, and provide better tactical equipment for first
responders. In addition, this research can enlighten the Military Police Corps leadership
on the importance of having an effective emergency management collaboration
agreement (with local law enforcement agencies) because the literature illustrated how
collaboration agreements between government entities and private organizations could be
advantageous for each organization (Kapucu et al., 2010). Multiagency collaboration will
result in substantial cost savings in services, a higher capacity, and enhancements to
service proficiency and quality.
Additionally, this phenomenological study is significant for civilian law
enforcement organizations because it identified best practices and lessons learned when
responding to an active shooter event. Although it is true that many civilian law
enforcement agencies have developed procedures to respond to and manage active
shooter events, numerous agencies (with 10 or less officers) could benefit from the
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phenomenological study because many organizations do not have adequate policies or
procedures on responding to an active shooter event.

Conclusion
The active shooter preparedness plan of the Military Police Corps was
unmistakably designed to protect the military community against active shooters. The
results of the study found that the current active shooter preparedness plan of the Military
Police Corps is obsolete and does not provide the best protection against active shooters.
Multiple law enforcement agencies throughout the nation have failed to have a
comprehensive active shooter preparedness plan that focuses on mitigation, preparedness,
response, and recovery. Law enforcement agencies should be encouraged to develop
comprehensive active shooter plans that address collaborative strategic planning between
local law enforcement agencies and adjacent jurisdictions to increase active shooter
preparedness effectiveness.
Using a phenomenological methodology assisted with identifying security gaps in
the active shooter preparedness plan of the Military Police Corps and recommending
solutions for the security gaps. The phenomenological methodology supported an
interpretive approach, which allowed the participant pool to use real-life situations to
describe how their agencies prepare for active shooter events. The IAD framework
illustrated multiple barriers that currently hinder the Military Police Corps from
implementing an effective and holistic active shooter preparedness plan that addresses the
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following four phases of an active shooter event: mitigation, preparedness, response, and
recovery.
The study found that law enforcement officers and emergency dispatchers were
not adequately trained (or properly equipped) in the most current active shooter tactics
used by civilian law enforcement organizations (state and federal). The study also
revealed that the amount of time allocated to active shooter preparedness training for the
first responders in the Military Police Corps is significantly less than the training
allocated for their tactical combat mission. A comprehensive approach to active shooter
preparedness should also address training issues, resources, technology, and
collaboration.
For law enforcement agencies, staying current on active shooter preparedness
literature is a necessity to maintain an effective active shooter preparedness training plan.
Mitigating the effects of an active shooter should be the objective of all active shooter
preparedness plans. To accomplish that objective, collaboration and coordination
between law enforcement personnel, administrators, and politicians must occur because
defending against active shooters is a problem set that requires a whole government
approach. Although this study adds to the overall body of literature for active shooter
preparedness training, it is not all encompassing because several areas within active
shooter preparedness, including financial resourcing, equipment, technology, and human
capital require further research.
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Appendix A: Interview Questions
1. What are the steps involved in your local law enforcement’s active shooter
preparedness plan?
2. What type of training do military police officers conduct in conjunction with local
law enforcement?
3. What are the similarities and differences between your unit’s active shooter
preparedness and local counterpart’s training?
4. In what ways does the military police provide training to the military community
(soldiers, family members, businesses, retirees, etc) on how to react if they are
involved in an active shooter event?
5. What type of activities does the Military Police Corps’ active shooter preparedness
training entail and how regularly do they occur?
6. What types of live active shooter exercises does the military police conduct with onpost businesses and how many other organizations are involved (fire, medical, etc.)?
7. How does the Military Police Corps’ culture affect active shooter preparedness
training?
8. What type of active shooter preparedness training do emergency dispatchers receive?
9. Under what circumstances is your organization’s active shooter preparedness plan
updated? How often does this occur?
10. How could your organization’s active shooter preparedness plan be improved?
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Appendix B: Demographic Questionnaire
Demographic Questions
1. Age:_______
2. Gender:_____
3. Current Rank:_________
4. Job Title: _____________________________
5. Education Level:
a. Doctoral Degree ______
b. Master’s Degree ______
c. Bachelor’s Degree______
d. Associate Degree________
e. Some College__________
f. High School Diploma______

